Supreme Court, U.S.
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No.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

IN THE MATTER OF
PETER P. NGHIEM,

Petitioner,

vs.

NEC ELECTRONICS, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; NEC CORPORATION (TOKYO), JAPAN (NIPPON ELECTRIC COMPANY), A JAPANESE CORPORATION; HIRO HASHIMOTO; H. YOSHIZAWA, DR.; GRANT HULSE,

Respondents.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PETER P. NGHIEM
Petitioner Pro Se
4324 Vanderbilt Drive
San Jose, California 95130
(408) 374-5974

5738
Lutz Appellate Services, Inc.
(800) 3 APPEAL • (800) 5 APPEAL • (800) BRIEF 21

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

In this petition for writ of certiorari, several issues related to Petitioner's right to due process and the importance of the question in administration of antitrust laws are presented to the Supreme Court of the United States. The questions presented for review are:

1. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, precludes federal courts from dismissing Petitioner's causes of action without affording him an opportunity for a judicial hearing on the merits of his case, despite the procedural mistake made by his counsel in failing to file a motion to vacate the arbitrary and capricious award in the district court.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals' denial of Petitioner's petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc, without providing any explanatory briefs and comments on the overlooked facts and arguments despite the presence of exceptional circumstances, violated his due process rights.

3. Whether the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. § 1 can render an arbitration award unenforceable where Petitioner was a worker engaged in both interstate and foreign commerce, and has an employment contract within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 1.

4. Whether an adverse arbitration award of antitrust claim is enforceable when Petitioner was fraudulently enticed to accept the binding arbitration clause in the company handbook by availing himself through arbitration, and the inducement in entering into such binding arbitration contract was itself a product of a conspiracy to defraud and disguise unlawful activities under Title VII and antitrust laws.

5. Should the instant case be reversed and remanded because the record discloses that the arbitration award was arbitrary and capricious, present a showing of exceptional circumstances, and there were important, material, and pertinent facts and available witnesses which should have been heard by a jury.

6. Should the important cause of action of unfair trade practice under antitrust laws which was not ruled by the arbitrator, survive dismissal by federal courts.

LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The Petitioner, Plaintiff-Appellant below, is Peter P. Nghiem, at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and of the State of California, and a resident of the State of California. Petitioner was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and of the State of California.

The Respondents, Defendants-Appellees below, are NEC Electronics, Inc., a California corporation, NEC Corporation (Tokyo) Japan (Nippon Electric Company), a Japanese corporation and co-employees, Hiro Hashimoto, Dr. H. Yoshizawa and Grant Hulse.

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Petitioner respectively requests the issuance of a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States, directed to the Honorable Alex Kozinski and Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation; and other Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; and to the Honorable Ronald M. Whyte, Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

OPINIONS BELOW

1. The official reported decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was filed June 3, 1994, and is reproduced in full in Appendix A, *Nghiem v. NEC Electronics, Inc.*, 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994). This decision affirmed the ruling of the district court, __F.Supp.__.

2. The reported decision of the United States Court for the Northern District of California, filed June 9, 1992, granting NEC's motion for confirmation of arbitration award and dismissing Petitioner's suit in its entirety, is reproduced in full in Appendix C, __F. Supp. __.

3. The revised reply brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, filed December 28, 1992, and the petition for rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellant with suggestion for rehearing en banc, timely filed June 17, 1994, by Petitioner in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, are reproduced in full in Appendix E and D, respectively. The Order of that court, denying petition for rehearing and rejecting suggestion for rehearing en banc, filed July 14, 1994, is reproduced in full in Appendix B.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction to grant the writ of certiorari is conferred on this

Court by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and Rule 20 of the Rules of this Court.

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) gives the Supreme Court the power to grant certiorari "before or after" the court of appeals renders judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 authorizes Supreme Court to issue certiorari to give full force and effect to existing appellate authority and for furthering justice in other kindred ways. *See Re 629 Church Street Bldg. Corp.*, 57 S. Ct. 88 (1936). The extraordinary writ is in support of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.

Although the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is final, it is subject to review by the Supreme Court of writ of certiorari. In *Haleck v. Berliner,* 427 F. Supp. 1225 (1977, D.C. Dist. Col.), the Court held that the language of District of Columbia statute (DCCE 11-1529(f)) stating that decisions of special court are "final and conclusive" should not be construed as attempt to preclude Supreme Court review of decisions of special court with respect to constitutional questions, and All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)) would be sufficient authorization for Supreme Court to entertain petition for appropriate writ if review of decision of special court were sought.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The provision of the Constitution of the United States involved in this petition is:

> AMENDMENT XIV (Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratified July 9, 1868).
>
> *Section 1.* All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United

> States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The statutes conferring jurisdiction on this Court to grant extraordinary writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and this Court's rule implementing that statutes, in pertinent part, are:

28 U.S.C.S. § 1254:

> Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods:
>
> > (1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree, . . .

28 U.S.C.S. § 1651(a):

> The Supreme Court and all courts established by Acts of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

28 U.S.C.S. § 2101(c):

> Any other appeal on writ of certiorari intended

> to bring any judgment or decree in a civil action, suit or proceeding before the Supreme Court for review shall be taken or applied for within 90 days after the entry of such judgment or decree. . . .

Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 20.1:

> The issuance by the Court of an extraordinary writ authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) is not a matter of right, but of discretion sparingly exercised. To justify the granting of any writ under that provision, it must be shown that the writ will be in aid of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, that there are present exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers, and that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a case where Petitioner's right to due process is violated by several circumstantial procedural errors. The case was dismissed in its entirety without having an opportunity for a full and fair trial on the merits, particularly the causes of action under Title VII and antitrust laws.

Petitioner, Peter Nghiem, an American citizen of Vietnamese heritage, was employed by NEC Electronics, Inc. in California as a Senior Product Marketing Engineer operating in the capacity of a "COT/CAD Product Marketing Manager" of the ASIC Strategic Marketing department from August 31, 1989 until he was unjustly discharged on June 11, 1990. Based upon the representations, promises and assurances made by Respondents that Petitioner's

rational advice and effort for NEC would be respected and that Petitioner would be rewarded with a long term management position with NEC despite his Vietnamese heritage, Petitioner accepted NEC's employment offer. Petitioner was assigned to create the infrastructure to support and expand the COT (Customer Owned Tooling) (ASIC foundry) business in the United States, develop marketing strategies, establish joint marketing activities and business alliance with United States CAD vendors, and improve the company's image through trade shows, technical seminars, marketing literatures and advertising.

Petitioner was directly involved in managing CAD projects and sales of semiconductor products across state lines and inter-continents between Japan and the United States. Petitioner's employment contract of "workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" fell within the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.

Shortly after Petitioner joined NEC, Petitioner proposed the adoption and integration of third party United States CAD vendors' tools to the NEC CAD design system to solve a major problem in gate array and standard cell layout work caused by NEC's antiquated in-house "place and route" software. In the corporate ASIC Product Planning meeting in Tokyo on November 16 and 17, 1989 with NEC Tokyo and NEC Europe representatives, Petitioner presented his "COT Strategic Marketing Plan" which also included CAD marketing and CAD development strategies. Petitioner received a favorable response from the Corporate Product Planning and Business Development Committee. Following Petitioner's proposal and after several months of intensive evaluation, in the second quarter of 1990, NEC decided to acquire the necessary technology and CAD tools from Cadence for around $20M through a technology partnership which saved NEC in excess of $30M and two to three years of development time.

Petitioner successfully completed several other projects in the CAD strategic marketing area in addition to the Cadence contract development and negotiation. Ever since NEC corporate sanctioned the joint development and technology partnership with United States CAD vendors early in 1990, Respondents exercised different tactics to steal Petitioner's work and his credit, and take it as Respondents' own to improve their career and relationship with NEC Tokyo while hindering Petitioner's advancement. Respondents conspired to ignore Petitioner's work accomplishments, harass, humiliate and mistreat Petitioner both in public and private, and to create an unfair performance evaluation in April of 1990 with pretextual reasons and false accusations to drive Petitioner out of NEC.

While Petitioner's initiatives in the CAD area were overwhelmingly adopted by Respondents, his efforts in the COT (ASIC foundry) area were not supported by Respondents who, on the facade, continued to urge Petitioner to fulfill the COT assignments. Respondents conspired to secretly hamper the COT business development by using Petitioner as a "scapegoat" to cover up their unlawful and unfair trade practice. Respondents deliberately obstructed the technical information transfer from NEC Tokyo to NEC Electronics Inc.'s facilities in the United States and hampered the formation of the COT technical support group in the United States, particularly at the domestic manufacturing facility in Roseville, California, in order to restrict production, control and fix price, and manipulate the market to the detriment of United States customers. NEC purposely delayed the development projects of United States customers, particularly PC chipset vendors such as Chips & Technologies to give NEC's PC system group the advantage of getting its products to the market ahead of United States competitors. By not setting up the required basic infrastructure to support COT customers in the United States and creating artificial barriers in the exchange of technical information and engineering support necessary for the completion

of customers' projects, NEC wrongfully and illegally exacted an advantage over its competitors. Nghiem refused to participate in NEC's hidden agenda.

When Nghiem reported to Human Resource Department on May 9, 1990 the management problem and the secret attempt of NEC to hamper the COT business development in the United States , Respondents immediately retaliated against Petitioner by creating false incidents of dispute and utilizing these incidences as grounds for Petitioner's dismissal on June 11, 1990. As part of a conspiracy to damage Petitioner's credibility as a witness to Respondents' unlawful activities, NEC acted wilfully and maliciously in framing and slandering Petitioner. NEC wrongfully accused Petitioner of having communication problems, lack of organizational skill, insubordination and unprofessional conduct to deprive his unemployment insurance benefits and compensations, prevent him from obtaining subsequent employment and destroy his career and his personal welfare.

Throughout the period of employment at NEC, Petitioner was subject to several discrimination practices of Respondents who outrageously mistreated Petitioner. Because of Petitioner's race and national origin, he was continuously and intentionally harassed, humiliated, intimidated and treated unfairly. Although Petitioner was well-qualified for a management position in consideration of his work accomplishments, strong academic background and work experience in the semiconductor industry, particularly in ASIC, NEC refused to promote Petitioner as promised because of his national origin. Instead of rewarding Petitioner for completing his work assignments and performing his job function exceptionally well, Respondents blacklisted, slandered and dismissed Petitioner, and deliberately violated his civil rights to subject Petitioner to mental anguish and severe emotional distress. None of these merits of the case, particularly the cause of action under antitrust laws, have been fully and fairly considered by the courts.

In good faith of resolving the problem internally with NEC, Petitioner exhausted all administrative procedures including arbitration as step four of the company's "Problem Resolution Process". Petitioner's employment contract with NEC did not contain a binding arbitration clause. However, Petitioner felt compelled to use the arbitration process because of the language of the handbook that said "[Step Four] is the only process by which an employee or terminated employee may pursue a complaint and "If you desire to pursue the complaint further, the complaint must be submitted to an impartial arbitrator or it is waived." Because of NEC's demands and representations, Petitioner followed the Step Four with the understanding that the arbitration would not be binding against him, but only against NEC.

On June 10, 1991, while going through arbitration process, Petitioner filed suit in state court, alleging eleven causes of action. On February 5, 1992, Petitioner filed the first amended complaint in state court with the same causes of action, wrongful termination, breach of implied-in-fact contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent representation, libel and slander, race discrimination, unjust enrichment, unfair trade practice and conspiracy. On November 18, 1991, the arbitrator rendered a decision in favor of NEC which was arbitrary and capricious. The arbitrator did not make any ruling on the statutory claim of antitrust violation because he assumed that Petitioner had dropped this claim.

On March 6, 1992, NEC removed the case to the federal district court. Petitioner's counsel did not file a motion to vacate the arbitrary and capricious arbitration award although Petitioner was entitled to vacation of such irrational award on the basis of fraud, undue means, manifest disregard of the law, and evident partiality and misconduct of the arbitrator. Moreover, Petitioner's counsel deliberately failed to include arguments supporting

Petitioner's causes of action under Title VII and antitrust laws in his "Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Opposition To Defendant NEC Electronics, Inc.'s Motion For Confirmation Of Arbitration Award And Dismissal, . . ." On June 9, 1992, *Nghiem v. NEC Electronics, Inc.*, __ F. Supp.__, the district court granted NEC's motion for confirmation of the arbitration award and dismissed Petitioner's suit in its entirety.

Petitioner timely filed his Notice of Appeal on June 16, 1992, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure § 4(a)(1). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 grants federal court jurisdiction to appeals "from all final decisions of the district courts."

On October 14, 1992, Petitioner timely appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On June 3, 1994, the Circuit Court ruled in favor of NEC, *Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc.*, 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994), affirming the district court's judgment while overlooking several critical arguments and material facts.

On June 17, 1994, Petitioner timely submitted a petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc to the Ninth Circuit Court directing the Court's attention to the material points of fact and law overlooked in the Court's decision and the exceptional circumstances. The Circuit Court denied the petition for rehearing and rejected the suggestion for rehearing en banc, without giving any explanatory brief or argument.

The District Court and Circuit Court refused to grant Petitioner evidentiary hearings and each of them ignored the evidence submitted by Petitioner demonstrating the merits of his claim. The courts enforced the arbitrary and capricious arbitration award as if it were a final judgment on all the merits of Petitioner's eleven causes of action.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. Failure to grant the writ of certiorari will cause irreparable injury to Petitioner since his due process right to full and fair judicial hearing on the merits of his claims, particularly his causes of action under Title VII and antitrust laws, will be deprived forever.

2. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court have so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. The Ninth Circuit Court's decision to affirm the district court's ruling which confirmed the arbitrary and capricious arbitration award and dismissed Petitioner's suit in its entirety without considering his constitutional right to due process; and deny Petitioner's petition for rehearing without considering the exceptional circumstances and giving any reasons, clearly manifests injustice and abuse of discretion.

3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overlooked the important question of the inapplicability of Federal Arbitration Act to "employment contract[s]" of Petitioner who was a "worker[s] engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" in light of the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. § 1, which has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court (*see* Appendix D, 27a-31a).

4. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has rendered a decision against Petitioner following the holding of *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,* 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), rather than the established doctrine of *American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,* 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) and its line of cases, while overlooking the very important fact that Petitioner's causes of action under antitrust laws were not ruled by the arbitrator, which is in conflict with the

decision of other United States Court of Appeals. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider Petitioner's supplemental argument in the petition for rehearing

5. The confirmation of the arbitrary and capricious arbitration award, and dismissal of Petitioner's entire suit was not in order since the importance question in administration of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act was not fully examined by the courts. Particularly when pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions filed in the instant case show genuine issue as to material facts.

I.

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED WARRANT THE GRANTING OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI WHERE PETITION WAS TIMELY FILED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c).

The exceptional circumstances presented warrant the exercise of the Court's power to issue a writ of certiorari since all other possible avenues of potential relief in federal courts have been exhausted but Petitioner's constitutional right to due process and his causes of action under Title VII and antitrust laws were still not considered. Adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court. Petitioner has exhausted all possible remedies. Error has been compounded on top of lower court error in confirming the arbitrary and capricious arbitration award, and dismissing the case in its entirety due to the district court's misinterpretation of Petitioner's intent in availing himself through arbitration and a serious procedural mistake made by his counsel in failing to file a motion to vacate the arbitration award in the district court.

Petitioner timely filed a petition for rehearing in the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which extended the 90-day period provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. The 90-day period started from July 14, 1994, the date on which the Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing. *See Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co.*, 568 F. Supp. 507 (1983).

II.

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ENTITLES PETITIONER TO A FULL AND FAIR HEARING ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE.

A petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States is the only method by which review of violation, in course of due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution can be made pursuant to U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. This Due Process Clause is the guidepost for every trial court procedure. It is well settled that due process is primarily concerned with providing a full and fair trial on the merits. *See Ridenour v. Bay Co.*, 114 N.W. 2d 172 (1962), citing *Grannis v. Orlean*, 34 S. Ct. 79, 783 (1914). Encompassed within this mandate of fairness and due process is the right of a civil litigant to request, in certain cases, that legal matters be heard by a panel of impartial jurors.

Petitioner has not had a full and fair hearing on the merits of his causes of action. Although due process requirements of fair trial also apply to procedures of administrative agencies, *See Bourque v. Dettone*, 589 A.2d 815 (R.I. 1991), Petitioner received an arbitrary and capricious arbitration award in favor of NEC. Such award was procured by undue means, witness perjury and, as being in manifest disregard of the law, abuse of discretion and evident partiality of the arbitrator.

Subsequently, Petitioner's request for a trial de novo at arbitration was rejected. The parties should be afforded a full and complete hearing at which the parties have an opportunity to call witnesses in their behalf and be heard by themselves or counsel. *See Fortenberry v. Fortenberry,* 338 So. 2d 806 (Miss.1976). If a full and complete hearing is not allowed by refusing a party his opportunity to present evidence, then he is thereby deprived of due process. In *Weeks v. Weeks,* 556 So. 2d 348 (Miss. 1990), the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that ex-husband was deprived of due process when chancellor prevented him from presenting his witnesses' testimony in support of his motion for new trial.

The Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the District Court's decision confirming the arbitrary and capricious arbitration award and dismissing Petitioner's suit in its entirety manifests injustice and deprived Petitioner of his right to due process. According to the Supreme Court in *TransAmerican National Gas Corp. v. Powell,* 811 S.W. 2d 913, 918 (Tex. 1991), "there are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the case." Concurrently, the Court in *Shook v. Gilmore & Tatge Mfg. Co.,* 851 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993), in a wrongful death action, reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings and held that court abused its discretion in dismissing causes of action with prejudice as without considering availability of lesser sanctions before dismissal or affording plaintiff an opportunity for hearing on the merits of his case.

The record does not support a presumption that Petitioner's claims lack merit. The courts made no analysis that would support the conclusion that Petitioner's claims were meritless in any of their opinions. *See U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Rossa,* 830 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Tex.App.-Waco 1992). Therefore, remand is necessary for development of material facts because the record

shows that there were important and pertinent facts and available witnesses which should have been heard. *See In Re Prine's Estate,* 208 So. 2d 187, 192 (Miss.1968)

The Ninth's Circuit refused to consider the overlooked arguments and material facts presented in the petition for rehearing. Petitioner's arguments, relying on *Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp.,* 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988), that allegations of fraud in the inducement relating specifically to an arbitration provision may suspend application of such provision; and *Armco Steel Co., L.P. v. CSX Corp.,* 790 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1991), that arbitration of antitrust claim is not enforceable when there was allegation that contract itself was product of violation of antitrust laws; were not considered by the Court of Appeals (*see* Appendix D, 32a-35a). Moreover, the Court of Appeals' decision in confirming the arbitration award and dismissing the entire suit is in conflict with *Armco, In re Hops Antitrust Litigation,* 655 F. Supp. 169, 171-172 (E.D. Mo.1987) and *Church v. Gruntal & Co.,* 698 F. Supp. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y.1988), where Petitioner's causes of action under antitrust laws should have survived dismissal because his antitrust claim was not submitted to the arbitrator for decision in the closing brief and the arbitrator did not rule on this issue. Besides, the Court of Appeals did not issue any explanatory briefs or arguments to support its denial of the petition.

The court in *Storer Communications v. Oldham County, Ky.App.,* 850 S.W. 2d 340 (1993), held that trial court's dismissal of taxpayer's suit, without motion, proper notice or briefs or arguments, violated taxpayer's due process rights. In *Potter v. McCall,* 433 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir.1970), where the plaintiff has paid the filing fees, the court may not dismiss an action before process is issued and served, and without giving plaintiff notice that the court intends to dismiss, an opportunity to oppose it, a statement of the grounds for dismissal, and an opportunity to amend.

The court in *Franklin v. Murphy,* 745 F.2d 1221 (1984), held that a district court can only dismiss an action *sua sponte* before service of process when it clearly lacks jurisdiction or the *in forma pauperis* (IFP) action is frivolous. *See Franklin v. State of Oregon, State Welfare Division, et al.,* 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (*Franklin I*). The legal component of the frivolity standard is similar to the test for dismissal of *pro se* complaints for failure to state a claim. *See Estelle v. Gamble,* 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976); *Haines v. Kerner,* 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972). However, pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief". In the instant case, Petitioner has come forward with ample evidence to substantiate his claims which have solid factual and legal basis for his causes of action. Therefore, the Court should grant certiorari to determine whether Petitioner has been erroneously deprived of jury trial of his case, *See Herdman v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,* 77 S. Ct. 455 (Ohio 1957), and consider question whether Petitioner was denied due process of law in violation of U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. *See Napue v. People of State of Ill.,* 79 S. Ct. 1173 (Ill.1959).

III.

THE IMPORTANT MEANING OF THE CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT EXCEPTION IN 9 U.S.C. § 1 HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, CLEARLY EXPLAINED AND SETTLED BY THE SUPREME COURT. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN APPLYING FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT TO PETITIONER'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WAS IN CONFLICT WITH OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS' HOLDING.

Although several circuit courts and the Supreme Court of West Virginia have ruled that Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply to "class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate

commerce" with "employment contracts" within the meaning of the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. § 1, the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet clearly explained the meaning of these contracts of employment exception in any of the Court's decisions. *See Copley v. NCR Corporation,* 394 S.E. 2d 751 (W. Va. 1990); *Rosen v. Transx LTD.,* 816 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Minn. 1993); *Herring v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,* 894 F.2d. 1020 (9th Cir.), 110 S. Ct. 1319 (1990); *Bacashihua v. U.S. Postal Serv.,* 859 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court should settle this important question of federal law and determine in the instant case whether Petitioner's claims should have been excluded from FAA because Petitioner was an individual worker personally engaged in both foreign and interstate commerce. (*See* Appendix D, 27a-31a).

In ruling that the Federal Arbitration Act governs the instant case despite the applicability of the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. § 1 to Petitioner's employment contract with NEC, the Ninth Circuit's decision was in conflict with other Court of Appeals in different circuits. Therefore, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari as it has consistently done so to resolve conflict between decisions of Courts of Appeals for two or more circuits. *See F.T.C. v. Flotill Products, Inc.,* 88 S. Ct. 401 (Cal.1967); *N.L.R.B. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,* 85 S. Ct. 1061 (R.I.1965); *Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.,* 81 S. Ct. 1579 (Ill. 1961); *Knetsch v. United States,* 81 S. Ct. 132 (Cal. 1960); *Federal Power Commission v. Tusearora Indian Nation,* 80 S. Ct. 543 (App. D.C. 1960); *Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc.,* 80 S. Ct. 332 (Ga. 1960); *United States v. Price,* 80 S. Ct. 326 (Ariz. 1960).

IV.

CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS BECAUSE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DECISIONS OF COURTS OF APPEALS IN DIFFERENT CIRCUITS AND IMPORTANCE OF QUESTION IN ADMINISTRATION OF CLAYTON ACT; PARTICULARLY WHEN PETITIONER'S ANTITRUST CLAIM WAS NOT RULED BY ARBITRATOR OR ANY COURT.

The Ninth Circuit in the instant case overruled its own precedent decision in *Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp.*, 738 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir.1984) following the holding of *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,* 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), rather than the established doctrine of *American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.*, 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.1968), and its line of cases to prevent submission of antitrust claims to arbitration. There was conflict between decisions of Courts of Appeals in different circuits on this issue. Nevertheless, both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit overlooked the very important fact that Petitioner's causes of action under antitrust laws was not ruled by the arbitrator. When there was a genuine issue as to material facts remaining for trial, particularly in antitrust action, the courts erred in dismissing the entire suit. Therefore, certiorari should be granted.

In *Minnesota M.& M. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Fin. Co.*, 85 S. Ct. 1473 (1965), the Court granted certiorari in private treble damages antitrust action because of conflicts between circuits, *also see Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co.*, 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964), and the importance of the question in the administration of the Clayton Act. Similarly, in *First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co.*, 88 S. Ct. 1575 (1968), certiorari was granted to determine whether decisions of federal courts were in

conformity with prior Supreme Court decision relating to availability of summary judgment in antitrust litigation.

Granting certiorari to resolve conflict between decisions of Courts of Appeals in different circuits in antitrust action was often performed by the Supreme Court. As in *Safeway Stores Inc. v. Vance, N.M.*, 78 S. Ct. 358 (1958), where the issue is whether private remedies afforded by Clayton Act, §§ 15 and 26 of Title 15, could be availed of for injuries allegedly caused by violations of Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, § 13a of Title 15. *See* companion case *Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co.*, 78 S. Ct. 352 (Ill. 1958). Similarly, the Court in *Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States*, 79 S. Ct. 763 (1959), granted certiorari to review case presenting question on which there was a conflict among the circuits as to whether antitrust proceedings against corporations would abate when those corporations were dissolved.

Therefore, taking into account the fact that Petitioner's causes of action under antitrust laws have neither been fully heard nor ruled by the arbitrator or any court, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to consider the important question in administration of antitrust laws where conflict of decisions between Court of Appeals of different circuits exists.

V.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY GRANTED CERTIORARI IN ANTITRUST ACTIONS TO CONSIDER QUESTION OF WHETHER A VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT OCCURS; PARTICULARLY WHERE RULINGS BY COURT OF APPEALS SEEMED TO THREATEN EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTION AS VITAL MEANS FOR ENFORCING ANTITRUST POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Petitioner's claim under the antitrust laws is not only a private matter but also a public interest issue. Since antitrust violation can affect millions of people and inflict staggering economic damage to the whole nation, The Court should grant certiorari to consider whether a violation of the Sherman Act occurs where NEC Electronics Inc., a Japanese electronics company's wholly owned subsidiary in the United States, and NEC Corporation in Japan, through its managerial employees, acted in concert to illegally restrain trade and fix price to detriment of United States customers in 1989 and 1990.

The Supreme Court has consistently granted certiorari to review antitrust action presenting question of administration and application of the Sherman Act. The Court in *Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.*, 79 S. Ct. 705 (1959), granted certiorari to consider question of whether a violation of the Sherman Act occurs where a group of business men act in concert to deprive a single merchant of the goods he needs to compete effectively, even though such action by the business men does not result in a reduction of opportunities for customers to buy in a competitive market. The Court in *Klor's* reversed judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming summary judgment and dismissing Klor's complaint, and remanded cause to district court for trial.

In *Kelly v. Kosuga,* 79 S. Ct. 59 (1959), the Court granted certiorari to consider availability of buyer's pleaded defense of illegality under the Sherman Act in an action to enforce the terms of a sale made under state law. Along the same line, the Court in *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Intern. Parts Corp.,* 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968), granted certiorari because it is inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to invoke broad common-law barriers to relief such as *in pari delicto,* where a private suit serves important public purposes to enforce the antitrust policy of the United States. Summary judgment for *Intern. Parts* affirmed by Court of Appeals was reversed and remanded with direction.

NEC's illegal restraint of trade by deliberately hampering the formation of the infrastructure to support and expand ASIC foundry business in the United States was verified by Defendant, Dr. Hitoshi Yoshizawa, an adversary witness, in his testimonies at arbitration (*see* Appendix G, 86a-87a). Moreover, Petitioner's pleadings and declaration affidavits show allegation of violations of the restraint of trade and price fixing §s of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act[1]. The importance of the question in administration of

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1. *Section 1 of the Sherman Act,* 15 U.S.C.A. § 1, provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . . ."

Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a), as amended, provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . ."

(Cont'd)

antitrust laws in the instant case warrants the issuance of writ of certiorari. As in *Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System,* 82 S. Ct. 486 (1962), the Court granted certiorari in action to recover treble damages based on alleged violations of the restraint of trade and monopoly section of the Sherman Law. The Court in *Poller* held that pleadings and affidavits presented issues of facts as to participation of a nationwide broadcasting company and others in a conspiracy to restrain trade or eliminate competition by cancelling an affiliation contract and eliminating a certain local broadcasting station from the broadcast field in a certain city, precluding summary judgment. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' judgment in *Poller* was reversed and remanded.

Certiorari was granted as to issues requiring examination in light of previous decisions of Supreme Court and presenting important questions under antitrust laws. *See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,* 82 S. Ct. 1404 (Cal. 1962). In order to determine scope of association's exemption from antitrust laws, the Court in *Case-Swayne Company v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.,* 88 S. Ct. 528 (1967), granted certiorari in treble damages antitrust action against orange growers association. *Also see De Beers Mines v. United States,* 325 U.S. 212 (1945).

The Supreme Court has also granted certiorari because of importance of the question in administration of Federal Trade Commission Act in *Federal Trade Com'n v. National Lead Co.,* 77

(Cont'd)

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15, states: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . , without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."

Section 16 of the Clayton Act grants a private cause of action for injunctive relief against "threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws."

S. Ct. 502 (1957), to review case presenting question of power of Federal Trade Commission to frame order entered upon finding that sellers had adopted and used zone pricing system in sale of lead pigments, to foster monopoly and stifle competition, prohibiting not only concert of action in further use of system but directing each individuality to cease and desist from a adopting such a system to match prices of competitors. *Also see Federal Trade Commission v. Dean Foods Co.*, 384 U.S. 597 (1966).

To consider question whether a violation of Sherman Act occurs where there is allegation of price fixing as part of NEC's conspiracy to illegally control production and restrain trade to manipulate market to detriment of United States customers (*see* Appendix G, paragraphs 16-18, pages 85a-87a), the Supreme Court should grant certiorari, reverse the judgment of Court of Appeals and remand the cause of action to District Court for trial. In *United States v. Shotwell Manufacturing Co.*, 77 S. Ct. 552 (1957), where defendants were convicted of income tax evasion, the government's petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court with limitations. The Court later in the same case, 78 S. Ct. 245 (1957) vacated such limited writ and granted nunc pro tunc the petition for certiorari without restriction, vacated judgment of Court of Appeals and remanded case to District Court for further proceedings.

It is not unusual that the Supreme Court, on certiorari, would vacate judgment of Court of Appeals and would remand case to District Court to make new and adequate findings of fact. *See C.I.R. v. Duberstein*, 80 S. Ct. 1190 (N.Y.1960). In *Dennett v. Hogan*, 9 S. Ct. 18 (Cal. 1973), the Court held that where it appeared that judge was unaware of petitioner's initial request for counsel and mistakenly believed that indigent petitioner had never filed financial affidavit with trial court, petition would be treated as one for certiorari which would be granted and case remanded to Court of Appeals for determination of whether appeal had been improvidently dismissed.

For good causes shown and the precedent favorable holdings of the Supreme Court in antitrust actions, Petitioner's request for granting of writ of certiorari, reversal of Ninth Circuit's decision and remand of cause to District Court for trial is warranted.

CONCLUSION

Unless relief is forthcoming from this Court, in the exercise of its writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ jurisdiction, the drastic harm caused to Petitioner by the judgments of the District Court and the Circuit Court, which is void because the merits and due process right were never considered, will become permanent and irreparable. There is no other remedy at law in any other forum for Petitioner to pursue further with his causes of action, particularly his claim under Title VII and antitrust laws.

With all the special and important reasons stated herein, Petitioner respectfully requests the Supreme Court to grant writ of certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case back to the District Court for further proceedings including a trial by jury.

Respectfully submitted,

PETER P. NGHIEM
Petitioner Pro Se
4324 Vanderbilt Drive
San Jose, California 95130
(408) 374-5974

APPENDIX A — DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECIDED JUNE 3, 1994

PETER P. NGHIEM, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEC ELECTRONIC, INC., a California corporation; NEC Corporation; Japan (Nippon Electric Company), a Japanese corporation; Hiro Hashimoto; H. Yoshizawa, Dr.; Grant Hulse, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 92-16155

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted as to Defendants-Appellees
Nov. 4, 1993.

Submitted as to Plaintiff-Appellant
Nov. 4, 1993.

Decided June 3, 1994.

David H. Tollner, San Jose, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.

David J. Murphy and Keith R. Black, Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy, San Jose, CA, for defendants-appellees.

Before KOZINSKI and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges; HATFIELD,* District Judge.

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* The Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge for the district of Montana, sitting by designation.

Appendix A

Opinion by Judge O'SCANNLAIN.

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

In this challenge to an arbitrator's award, we are asked to decide, among other issues, whether the so-called "*American Safety* doctrine" continues to prevent submission of antitrust claims to arbitration.

I

Peter Nghiem, an American citizen of Vietnamese heritage, was employed by NEC Electronics, Inc. in California from August 31, 1989 until he was fired in June 1990. Nghiem brought suit against NEC Electronics, Inc., NEC Corporation (Tokyo) Japan, and co-employees (collectively "NEC") alleging, inter alia, wrongful termination, race discrimination, and an antitrust violation. Nghiem claims that NEC had represented that it would provide a long-term management position to Nghiem if he accepted its employment offer.

On August 31, 1989, Nghiem signed an employment contract which did not contain an arbitration clause. Paragraph 11 of the contract states, in part: "No terms or provisions of this Agreement shall be varied or modified by any prior or subsequent act of either me or the Company except that the Company and I may subsequently amend this agreement by written instruments that specifically refer to this agreement and that are executed in the same manner as this agreement." Nghiem claims that he did not sign a modified version of NEC's employment contract because it contained a clause for binding arbitration.

On September 5, 1989 and May 7, 1990, Nghiem signed

acknowledgments for receipt of NEC's company handbook. The handbook explained that NEC had a four-step "Problem Resolution Process" for employee complaints. Nghiem claims that he felt compelled to use this process because the language of the handbook said that this was the only process for resolving employee complaints. Step Four of the process is "final and binding arbitration." Nghiem followed the four-step process, including initiating arbitration pursuant to Step Four.

Through the spring of 1991, Nghiem presented evidence and argument in the arbitration hearings, including a fifty-page closing brief. On November 18, 1991, the arbitrator rendered a decision in favor of NEC. On November 27, 1991, Nghiem wrote the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") to request a trial de novo and to confirm that the arbitration was not binding on him.

Meanwhile, on June 10, 1991, Nghiem had filed suit in state court on substantially the same issues. NEC removed to federal district court on March 6, 1992. On June 9, 1992, — F.Supp. — the district court granted NEC's motion for confirmation of the arbitration award and dismissed Nghiem's suit in its entirety, including the statutory claims of employment discrimination and an antitrust violation.

II

Nghiem contends that he is not bound by the arbitrator's decision because the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or "the Act"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, requires that an agreement to arbitrate be in writing. 9 U.S.C. § 2. Nghiem points out that the contract he signed does not have an arbitration clause and that he did not sign a proposed subsequent contract which did. Although Nghiem claims that NEC told him he had to pursue arbitration, that is inconsistent with his claim that he consciously avoided signing any agreement

which would require him to pursue arbitration. The district court found that Nghiem voluntarily initiated binding arbitration and this finding is not clearly erroneous.

Nghiem further claims that he intended the arbitration to be nonbinding against him, but binding against NEC; his position is not persuasive. While the FAA "requires a writing, it does not require that the writing be signed by the parties." *Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co.*, 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir.1987). In addition to the employee handbook, which provides for binding arbitration and which Nghiem acknowledges receiving, on September 21, 1990, Nghiem wrote a letter to NEC's Human Resource Director, Denny Mitchell, requesting to proceed with Step Four of NEC's problem resolution process — final and binding arbitration. This constitutes a writing memorializing an agreement to arbitrate.

Furthermore, even if these writings are insufficient, "[a]n agreement to arbitrate an issue need not be express; . . . it may be implied from the conduct of the parties." *Fortune, Alsweet & Eldridge, Inc. v. Daniel*, 724 F.2d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir.1983); *see also Teamsters Local Union No. 764 v. J.H. Merritt and Co.*, 770 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir.1985) (citing *Daniel*). In *Daniel*, this court reasoned that Daniel's conduct manifested an intent to arbitrate his dispute with his union because he sent a representative to the arbitration who listened to the union's evidence, presented limited evidence himself, and requested a second continuance. Two weeks later, Daniel's representative sent a letter to the arbitration board, claiming Daniel had no obligation to arbitrate and refusing to attend future hearings. The arbitrator issued a decision adverse to Daniel who appealed, arguing that the arbitrator had no such authority.

This court confirmed the arbitration award, holding that "[w]e have long recognized a rule that a party may not submit a claim to

arbitration and then challenge the authority of the arbitrator to act after receiving an unfavorable result." *Daniel,* 724 F.2d at 1357. The court held that even though Daniel attempted to deny the arbitrator's authority before a decision was issued, "[i]t would be unreasonable and unjust to allow Daniel to challenge the legitimacy of the arbitration process, in which he had voluntarily participated over a period of several months, shortly before the arbitrator announced her decision." *Id.*

Similarly in this case, Nghiem initiated the arbitration, attended the hearings with representation, presented evidence, and submitted a closing brief of fifty pages. Although he filed suit in state court before the arbitrator announced his final decision, that decision is still binding on Nghiem under *Daniel.* Once a claimant submits to the authority of the arbitrator and pursues arbitration, he cannot suddenly change his mind and assert lack of authority. Nghiem is bound by the arbitrator's decision.

Furthermore, Nghiem's voluntary initiation of arbitration can be interpreted as waiver of any objection he may have had over the authority of the arbitrator. The Fifth Circuit has reasoned that "[o]n whatever basis it rests, waiver, estoppel or new contract, the result is that the grievance submitted to the arbiter defines his authority without regard to whether the parties had a prior legal obligation to submit the dispute." *Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse Independent Truck Drivers Union, Local No. 1,* 611 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1980). This court in *Daniel* concluded that the appellant's "conduct demonstrated he agreed to submit this conflict to arbitration and waived any right to object." *Daniel,* 724 F.2d at 1357.

Finally, the Supreme Court has held that "as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be

resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of *waiver,* delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3353-54, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (quoting *Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp.*, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)) (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that Nghiem has waived any objection to the arbitrator's authority to decide his claims.

NEC argues, as it did before the district court, that if the federal courts do not confirm the arbitration award pursuant to the FAA, the courts should, in the alternative, dismiss Nghiem' action or grant summary judgment based on res judicata or collateral estoppel, or both. Like the district court, we do not reach these arguments because we conclude that Nghiem clearly submitted his claim to binding arbitration.

III

Even if the arbitration is valid, Nghiem nevertheless claims that his employment discrimination complaint cannot be settled through such process and must be adjudicated in federal court. Although the earlier Supreme Court cases precluded Title VII cases from being subjected to compulsory arbitration, *Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.*, 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), the Court has recently opened the door to arbitration of these claims. *Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp.*, 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). Before *Gilmer,* this court read *Alexander* as holding "that an employee's statutory right to trial de novo under Title VII is not foreclosed by prior submission of her claim to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement." *Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc.*, 935 F.2d

1083, 1086 (9th Cir.1991). Although "the Supreme Court [did] not overrule *Alexander* in *Gilmer,* it [did] reject a reading of *Alexander* as prohibiting the arbitration of employment discrimination claims." *Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,* 948 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir.1991).

The test of whether a statutory claim may be subject to arbitration is congressional intent. *Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,* 482 U.S. 220, 227, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987). Nghiem does not argue that Congress intended to exclude Title VII claims from arbitration. In any event, subsequent to *Gilmer,* this court has specifically upheld an employer's ability to arbitrate a Title VII claim. *Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,* 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir.1992) (plaintiff did not meet "her burden of showing that Congress, in enacting Title VII, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under the Act").

Nghiem rather argues that *Gilmer* does not apply because the 1991 amendments to Title VII provide for jury trial. We conclude, however, that establishing a right to jury trial for Title VII clams does not evince a congressional intent to preclude arbitration; it merely defines those procedures which are available to plaintiffs who pursue the federal option, as opposed to arbitration.

Title VII claims are clearly subject to arbitration and Nghiem's argument, therefore, fails.

IV

Nghiem further contends that his antitrust claims should be heard in federal court because antitrust claims are not subject to arbitration. Nghiem relies on *American Safety Equipment Corp. v.*

J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.1968). In *American Safety*, the Second Circuit held that antitrust claims cannot be arbitrated because of the public interest in enforcing antitrust laws, the potential bias and limited expertise of arbitrators, the complexity of antitrust law, and the procedural differences between trials and arbitrations. *Id.* 826-27. Until now, this circuit has followed the holding and reasoning of *American Safety*. *Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp.*, 738 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir.1984).

In light of more recent Supreme Court decisions, however, we must review whether it is appropriate to continue to follow *American Safety*. "We are bound by decisions of prior panels' unless an en banc decision, Supreme Court decision or subsequent legislation undermines those decisions." *United States v. Washington*, 872 F.2d 874, 880 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting *Montana v. Johnson*, 738 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1984)). In *Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614, 632-35, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3356-58, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), however, the Supreme Court has indeed undermined the reasoning behind *American Safety*. In *Mitsubishi*, the Court held that an antitrust claim could be submitted to an international arbitral tribunal.

Although *Mitsubishi* found "it unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the *American Safety* doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transactions," *Mitsubishi*, 473 U.S. at 629, 105 S.Ct. at 3355, we are persuaded that the decision is not restricted to the international context. Several reasons support this conclusion. First, the Supreme Court has subsequently cited *Mitsubishi* for the general proposition that antitrust claims can be arbitrated. *Gilmer*, 500 U.S. at 26-27, 111 S.Ct. at 1652.

Second, in *Mitsubishi* the Supreme Court specifically refuted the analysis of *American Safety,* confessing its "skepticism of certain aspects of the *American Safety* doctrine." *Mitsubishi,* 473 U.S. at 632, 105 S.Ct. at 3356. Initially, the Court reasoned that "[t]he mere appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone warrant invalidation of the selected forum on the undemonstrated assumption that the arbitration clause is tainted." *Id.* With respect to complexity, the Court explained that "[t]he anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account when the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral rules typically provide for the participation of experts either employed by the parties or appointed by the tribunal." *Id.* at 633, 105 S.Ct. at 3357. The Court concluded that "the factor of potential complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral could not properly handle an antitrust matter." *Id.* at 633-34, 105 S.Ct. at 3357. Regarding arbiter bias, the Court took note that international arbitrators are frequently drawn from the legal and business communities, and "decline[d] to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators." *Id.* at 634, 105 S.Ct. at 3358. Finally, the Court addressed "the core of the *American Safety* doctrine," that the private cause of action is fundamental to enforcing antitrust laws, by concluding that "[t]he importance of the private damages remedy . . . does not compel the conclusion that it may not be sought outside an American court." *Id.* at 635, 105 S.Ct. at 3358. Given the Court's meticulous step-by-step disembowelment of the *American Safety* doctrine, this circuit will no longer follow *American Safety.* We hold that *Mitsubishi* effectively overruled *American Safety* and its progeny, including *Lake Communications.*

Third, *Mitsubishi* may be seen as evidence of the Supreme Court's desire to make statutory rights subject to arbitration. In

holding that claims brought under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, can be subject to arbitration, the Supreme Court noted that the "federal policy favoring arbitration" established by the FAA "is not diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights." *Shearson/American Express v. McMahon*, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987). One scholar summed up the situation concisely:

> The reasoning used by the Court in *McMahon* to support its holding regarding the arbitrability of 1934 Act and RICO claims, however, suggests that domestic antitrust disputes are likewise subject to arbitration. . . . The *McMahon* Court made no distinction between the international and domestic arbitral forums, but rather stated that domestic and international arbitrators are equally able to handle complex statutory schemes involving treble damage remedies. Such reasoning, in combination with the FAA *can only mean*, the judicially implied *antitrust exemption to the FAA no longer exists.*

G. Richard Shell, "Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration," 35 UCLA L.Rev. 623, 624 n. 7 (1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Because arbitrators are not precluded from entertaining antitrust claims, Nghiem's argument fails.

V

Finally, Nghiem argues that the arbitrator's decision was

arbitrary and capricious. Not only was this argument not made in the district court, but Nghiem raises it for the first time in his reply brief. Nghiem now alleges witness perjury, procurement of arbitration award by undue means, arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law, and misconduct.

We dismiss these arguments as untimely raised. An appellate court will dismiss arguments not raised at the district court, unless there are exceptional circumstances. *FSLIC v. Butler,* 904 F.2d 505, 509 (9th Cir.1990). Nghiem does not even attempt to show exceptional circumstances.

VI

We conclude that the arbitrator had authority over the claim because Nghiem voluntarily submitted to binding arbitration and is, therefore, bound by the arbitrator's decision. The arbitrator was not precluded from deciding the Title VII and antitrust claims.

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, ENTERED JULY 14, 1994, DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REJECTING SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 92-16155

D.C. No. CV-92-20135-RMW

PETER P. NGHIEM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEC ELECTRONIC, INC., a California corporation; NEC CORPORATION; JAPAN (NIPPON ELECTRIC COMPANY), a Japanese corporation; HIRO HASHIMOTO; H. YOSHIZAWA, DR.; GRANT HULSE,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Before: KOZINSKI and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges; HATFIELD,* District Judge.

The panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing. Judges

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* The Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge for the district of Montana, sitting by designation.

Appendix B

Kozinski and O'Scannlain have voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc and Judge Hatfield has so recommended.

The full court has been advised of the en banc suggestion, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on it.

The petition for rehearing is DENIED and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is REJECTED.

APPENDIX C — DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, ENTERED JUNE 9, 1992

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. C-92-20135-RMW (EAI)

PETER P. NGHIEM,

Plaintiff,

v.

NEC ELECTRONICS, INC., a California corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND DISMISSAL OF ACTION

The motions of defendants NEC Electronics, Inc. for confirmation of arbitration award and dismissal or, alternatively, to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, alternatively, for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication came on regularly for hearing on May 29, 1992. The court has read the moving and responding papers and heard the oral argument of all counsel. GOOD CAUSE appearing therefor, the court finds and orders as follows.

Plaintiff Peter Nghiem ("plaintiff") began his employment with NEC Electronics, Inc. ("NEC") on August 31, 1989. On that same day, plaintiff signed a document entitled "NEC Employment,

Invention and Confidential Information Agreement". That document did not contain a provision for the arbitration of any disputes that should arise between plaintiff and NEC.

On September 5, 1989, plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the NEC Employee Handbook, as well as a letter of introduction from the Director of Human Resources at NEC. Both the letter and the handbook discuss NEC's "problem resolution process", which outlines a four-step process by which an aggrieved employee may seek redress for the resolution of problems. The handbook states that the process "applies to disputes, problems, complaints or claims (collectively, "Complaints") arising out of conduct by you or the company, your employment relationship with the company or the commencement or termination of that relationship". Step Four (4) of the process provides for the submission of the complaint to an impartial arbitrator. The provisions of Step Four state that the "decision of the arbitrator will be final and legally binding on the company and the employee to the full extent permitted by law."

Plaintiff was terminated from his position with NEC in June of 1990. Plaintiff then initiated NEC's problem resolution process and followed that process through step four. An arbitration was held before Arbitrator John Kagel in a proceeding before the American Arbitration Association. Plaintiff presented his evidence and arguments to the arbitrator, as well as a fifty (50) page "closing" brief, detailing his position.

The arbitrator issued a decision on November 18, 1991, denying plaintiff all his requested relief. Plaintiff did not move to vacate the award. Rather, plaintiff initiated this action in February of 1992 in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Defendants removed the action to this court on March 6, 1992. Defendants now

seek to confirm the arbitration award, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, *et seq.*, and dismiss this action, or, alternatively, move the court to dismiss this action or grant summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on the basis that plaintiff's claims are barred by *res judicata* and/or collateral estoppel arising from the arbitration award. Plaintiff opposes the motions on the basis that he did not agree to submit his claims to binding arbitration.

"It is a cardinal principal that arbitration is a matter of contract; arbitration cannot be compelled absent an express agreement to arbitrate". *Brown v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.*, 664 F. Supp. 969, 971 (E.D. Pa. 1987). In this action, unlike the situation presented in *Brown,* there is evidence of an express agreement on the part of plaintiff to submit his claims regarding his alleged wrongful termination to binding arbitration. Although plaintiff did not sign an express agreement to arbitrate when he initially signed his employment agreement (and later refused to sign an employment agreement which contained an arbitration provision), plaintiff did expressly agree to arbitrate when he elected *in writing* to proceed with the NEC resolution process and, in particular, requested to proceed to step four (4) of that process, binding arbitration. As noted above, the NEC handbook specifically provides for the submission of employee complaints to *binding* arbitration. The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff voluntarily initiated this procedure. Plaintiff wrote a letter to the Director of Human Resources, Mr. Denny Mitchell, and stated, "I would like to pursue to the Step 4 of NEC's Complaint Procedure since I am not satisfied with the decision of the Executive Personnel Committee in response to my appeal in Step 3." (Exhibit Six (6) to the Denny Mitchell Declaration). As pointed out above, Step Four (4) specifically provides that the decision of the arbitrator will be legally binding and final.

Appendix C

Thereafter, plaintiff voluntarily participated in the arbitration without ever objecting to the process and/or indicating that he believed the process would be non-binding. By his express and voluntary request to proceed to arbitration, as well as his direct participation in the arbitration itself, plaintiff "accepted" NEC's "offer" in its handbook to avail himself of the arbitration process, thereby creating an express binding agreement between himself and NEC to arbitrate the dispute surrounding the termination of his employment.

In addition, plaintiff's verified complaint filed in this matter specifically incorporated the provisions of the NEC handbook which govern binding arbitration and stated that those provisions formed, at least in part, the basis of plaintiff's employment agreement with NEC. (First Amended Complaint for Damages, page 6, line 1 through 6).

Thus, plaintiff acknowledged in his complaint the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the present dispute. Plaintiff cannot now contend that no such agreement existed and that he never agreed to submit his complaint to binding arbitration. "Parties to arbitration proceedings cannot sit idle while an arbitration decision is rendered and then, if the decision is adverse, seek to attack the award collaterally on grounds not raised before the arbitrator." *United Steelworkers, etc. v. Smoke-Craft, Inc.*, 652 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1980).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant NEC's motion for confirmation of the arbitration award and dismissal of this action is hereby GRANTED. The arbitration award is confirmed and, based upon the confirmation, plaintiff's complaint is hereby

Appendix C

DISMISSED. NEC's alternative motions to dismiss this action, or, to grant summary judgment and/or summary adjudication, are, hereby DENIED as moot. Judgment is hereby entered against plaintiff and in favor of defendants.

DATED: JUNE 9, 1992

s/ Ronald M. Whyte
RONALD M. WHYTE
United States District Judge

COPIES OF ORDER MAILED ON June 9, 1992 TO:

David J. Murphy, Esq.
LITTLER, MENDELSON, FASTIFF & TICHY
60 South Market Street, Suite 1100
San Jose, CA 95113-2303

David H. Tollner, Esq.
Law Offices of David H. Tollner
111 North Market Street, #1020
San Jose, CA 95113

APPENDIX D — PETITION FOR REHEARING OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WITH SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC SUBMITTED ON JUNE 17, 1994

PETER P. NGHIEM
4324 VANDERBILT DR.
SAN JOSE, CA 95130
TEL: (408) 374-5974

Appellant-Plaintiff
In Pro Per

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

U.S. Court of Appeals Docket Number:
92-16155

Lower Court Docket Number:
CV-92-20135 RMW (EAI)

IN THE MATTER OF:

PETER P. NGHIEM,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

v.

NEC ELECTRONICS, INC., a California corporation, NEC CORPORATION (TOKYO), Japan (Nippon Electric Company), a Japanese corporation, HIRO HASHIMOTO, DR. H. YOSHIZAWA, GRANT HULSE and DOES 1-100 inclusive,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Appendix D

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WITH SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

I.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This Petition For Rehearing is made to direct the Ninth Circuit's attention to the material points of fact and law overlooked in the Court's decision rendered on June 3, 1994 affirming the District Court's ruling in favor of Defendants-Appellees. Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests the Court to reconsider the entire appeal in light of the applicability of the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. Section 1. Besides, arbitration contract obtained by fraud is unenforceable.

In reviewing this petition, the Court is asked to consider the exceptional circumstances which had forced Plaintiff-Appellant to raise the arguments on arbitrary and capricious arbitration award the first time in the Reply Brief. Supplemental facts are presented to show the Court the existence and severeness of these exceptional circumstances. The material points of fact neglected by the Court in the decision are listed in the Statement Of Counsel section.

Since the instant case is not governed by the FAA pursuant to the exclusion in 9 U.S.C. Section 1, Appellant respectfully requests that the Court reconsider his statutory right for full

judicial remedies under Title VII, Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Clayton Act. In addition, under the extraordinary circumstances shown in this petition, the Court is requested to remand the matter back to the District Court for an amended motion to vacate if it is deemed proper, and further proceedings including a trial by jury.

II.

GROUNDS FOR SUGGESTING EN BANC CONSIDERATION

The proceeding involves several questions of exceptional importance (FRAP 35, Circuit Rule 35) such as whether the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. Section 1 can render an arbitration award unenforceable; whether the exceptional circumstances permit the Court to consider untimely raised arguments for a remand to vacate; whether an arbitrary and capricious arbitration award with initial vacating actions construed as commencement of motion can be vacated when the statute of limitation has expired; whether an arbitration contract procured by fraud is enforceable; whether an arbitration contract as itself a product of antitrust violation conspiracy valid; whether Appellant still has statutory right to judicial remedies under Title VII and antitrust laws in spite of the procedural mistakes made by his counsel; whether an antitrust claim not ruled by the arbitrator should reach the jury where it belongs.

III.

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL

This is a petition for rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellant Peter P. Nghiem, hereinafter "Nghiem" or "Appellant", for an appeal from

a motion for confirmation of the arbitration award and dismissal of the case granted in favor of Defendants-Appellees NEC Electronics Inc., NEC Corporation (Tokyo) Japan and coemployees, hereinafter "NEC" or "Appellee(s)".

In Appellant's judgment the following material points of fact and law were overlooked in the Court's decision:

1. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply to the instant case because Nghiem was a worker personally "engaged in foreign and interstate commerce" under a "contract of employment" with NEC within the meaning of the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. Section 1.

2. The Court misinterpreted Nghiem's intent in availing himself of arbitration while he was fraudulently induced to accept a *binding* arbitration provision not included in his employment contract. Nghiem was led to believe by NEC's representations and the misleading language in NEC's company handbook that he had to exhaust all administrative procedures before he could take legal action in the State Court.

3. Arbitration was not the first step in resolving a dispute in NEC's company problem resolution process. In Step 3 of this process Appellant's complaint was reviewed by NEC's personnel committee. Step 4 of this process ordered "If you desire to pursue your Complaint further, the Complaint must be submitted to an impartial arbitrator or it is waived" (See Exhibit I, p.27 of E.R.). It is doubtful that Appellant's interests can be represented or resolved by any step of this grievance process, but Appellant still had to go through them all to exhaust the administrative remedies.

4. Nghiem availed himself of arbitration assuming that he could still have the option to file a lawsuit in the State Court

afterward since he had not signed any agreement for *binding* arbitration. At all time, Nghiem thought that arbitration is not final and legally binding on him because he had not signed any written contract to that effect.

5. Nghiem consciously avoided signing a new employment contract presented to him early in 1990, approximately five months after he joined NEC. The new employment contract contains the unambiguous *employment-at-will* language and the new *binding arbitration* provision. Nghiem did not contradict with this action when he later availed himself of arbitration believing that it was non-binding on him and it was only an administrative process to resolve the problems internally with NEC.

6. The arbitrator did not make any ruling on the antitrust issue in the arbitration award. The arbitrator presumed that the unfair trade practice claim was dropped, while Nghiem supposed that private arbitration was not the right forum for such an important issue under antitrust laws.

7. Besides the "Unfair Trade Practice" issue, several other causes of action such as "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress", "Unjust Enrichment" and "Conspiracy" were not fully presented and ruled at arbitration.

IV.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

All the facts stated in the "Supplemental Declaration of Peter Nghiem", and "Declaration of Peter Nghiem", inclusive, are incorporated by reference. Due to the *complexity* of the case, Nghiem respectfully requests the Court to *carefully examine the*

incorporated facts supported by the "Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff", hereinafter "E.R", and the "Supplemental Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff", hereinafter "S.E.R.", which prove that the arbitration award is arbitrary and capricious, and Nghiem has come forward with specific material facts supporting his claims. The appeal will be incomplete without the incorporated facts.

There were *exceptional circumstances* for the Court to consider Nghiem's arguments on the arbitrary and capricious arbitrator's decision although they were raised the first time in his reply brief:

1. Nghiem's counsel, Mr. David H. Tollner, failed to timely file a motion to vacate the arbitrary and capricious arbitrator's decision in the District Court while Nghiem did not know that the court procedure required him to file such a motion. Nghiem did not think that arbitration was final and legally binding on him. Nevertheless, Nghiem did request a trial de novo and confirmed his non-binding arbitration position on November 27, 1991 (See Exhibit M, p. 34 of Excerpts of Record), shortly after the arbitration award was rendered on November 18, 1991. Subsequently, Nghiem filed the "First Amended Complaint" in Santa Clara County Superior Court on February 5, 1992 (See Exhibit S, p.63 of Excerpts of Record) to continue his lawsuit against NEC previously initiated on June 10, 1991. Nghiem did not "sit[s] idle while arbitration decision is rendered".

2. Nghiem's counsel failed to raise the argument that the arbitration award was arbitrary and capricious in the District Court although Nghiem was entitled to vacation of the irrational award on the basis of fraud, undue means, manifest disregard of the law, and evident partiality and misconduct of the arbitrator.

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3. Nghiem wrote a letter to his counsel on April 2, 1992 presenting the important facts, arguments and exhibits to be included in the response to Defendants' motion for confirmation of arbitration award and dismissal of the case. Nghiem's counsel deliberately failed to incorporate some of these critical facts, arguments and exhibits requested by Nghiem nor cited the vital Federal Statutes supporting Nghiem's right to trial by jury in his response. On May 14, 1992, Nghiem's counsel showed him a draft copy of the "Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Opposition To Defendant NEC Electronics, Inc.'s Motion For Confirmation Of Arbitration Award And Dismissal, . . ." which included a reference to Title VII as requested when he asked Nghiem to review and sign the "Declaration of Peter Nghiem In Opposition To Defendant NEC Electronics, Inc.'s Motion . . ." dated May 15, 1992. At that time Nghiem specifically requested his counsel again to add an argument on antitrust violation and a reference to antitrust laws. When Nghiem received the final copy of the "Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Opposition To Defendant NEC Electronics, Inc.'s Motion . . ." which had been filed in the District Court, he was surprised that neither one of the two essential Federal Statutes under Title VII and antitrust laws highlighting the backbone issues of the case was included as requested.

4. When Nghiem found out that the District Court misinterpreted Nghiem's intent at arbitration and dismissed the case on June 9, 1992 because of procedural reasons, and because several material facts and laws pertinent to the case had not been presented to the Court, Nghiem insisted his counsel to immediately file the "Notice Of Appeal". His counsel refused to do the appeal and did not seem to represent him for his interest. Nghiem then had to get directly involved in the preparation of the appeal as he had done the same for the "First Amended Complaint". Nghiem had to

do the legal research and preparation of arguments for the appeal on his own. The briefs were reviewed, edited and approved by Nghiem's counsel for submission after Nghiem had to spend several hours to convince him of the relevancy and validity of every laws and precedent cases cited in the briefs.

5. Nghiem's counsel was reluctant to present to the Court the unlawful activities of Defendants-Appellees in violating Title VII and antitrust laws including illegal restraint of trade and price fixing until Nghiem raised the issue of obstruction of justice against him under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(2).

6. On the hearing day of November 4, 1993 in the Ninth Circuit, Nghiem's counsel suddenly refused to do the oral argument for Nghiem in the last minute stating that he just changed his mind and no longer agreed with the content of the briefs. Knowing that his counsel were not prepared for the oral argument and might have a hidden agenda of his own, Nghiem had to persuade him to, at least, appear in the court room and submit the briefs as they stood since they were already very comprehensive, otherwise the Court would not consider the appeal. Finally, Nghiem's counsel agreed to appear in Court for Nghiem but he skipped the oral argument.

7. On June 9, 1994 at around 11:15 AM, Nghiem's counsel handed to him the decision of the Ninth Circuit, filed on June 3, 1994, and stated that he had just received it two days earlier. Nghiem's counsel then refused to file a Petition For Rehearing for Nghiem and told him to do it on his own if he desired to go any further. Since there was not enough time for Nghiem to retain a new counsel for continuance, Nghiem had to submit the Petition For Rehearing in pro per.

8. Defendants' conspiracy to mar Appellant's credibility as the key witness of their unlawful activities and deter him from coming forward and follow through with his action has not stopped since he was wrongfully terminated by NEC. This conspiracy to disguise wrongdoings and impede the due course of justice has continued throughout litigation and at Appellant's subsequent place of employment, Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc., another Japanese subsidiary corporation in the United States, where he was again unjustly discharged on May 21, 1993 after being sexually harassed, mistreated and discriminated. On May 20, 1994, Appellant filed a lawsuit against Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc., in Santa Clara Superior Court, Docket Case No. CV740872, which included eleven causes of action including libel and slander, and conspiracy.

V.

SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT

A. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS OF DISCHARGED WORKER INVOLVED IN INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE AGAINST FORMER EMPLOYER IN LIGHT OF EXCLUSION PROVISION IN 9 U.S.C. SECTION 1.

Since the Court overlooked the argument on the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. Section 1, the arguments in Section A of Part III of the Revised Reply Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff (p.2:5-28, 3:1-28, 4:1-28, 5:1-9), inclusive, are incorporated by reference.

Appellant contends that the District Court's reliance on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. Section 1 et seq., is inappropriate because the type of dispute involved in the instant case concerns

"employment contracts" of "workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce", which are specifically excluded from the FAA. 9 U.S.C. Section 1.

The employment contract of Appellant who was directly involved in managing the sales of semiconductor products across state lines and inter-continents between Japan and the United States, fell within contracts of employment exception contained in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Therefore, the District Court had no jurisdiction under FAA to compel enforcement of arbitration clause in employment contract or company handbook which was the case for Appellant whose employment contract had no arbitration provision. The exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. Section 1 specifically provides exemption for employment contracts of workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. This exclusion provision applies to the instant case where Appellant was a worker engaged in both interstate and foreign commerce.

Appellant had an employment contract with NEC Electronics, Inc., a California corporation, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of NEC Corporation in Tokyo, Japan. NEC manufactures and markets products internationally and throughout the United States. Appellant's office was based in Mountain View, California, but his product management and sales promotion activities cover a large territory including most parts of the United States. Appellant was in charge of setting up and promoting the sales of ASIC foundry (COT, Customer Owned Tooling) business in the United States in addition to the sales of ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) products. Appellant also managed CAD (Computer Aided Design) strategic marketing activities including product planning, development of CAD product strategies, and negotiation of corporate CAD development and purchase contracts with U.S

CAD vendors nationwide. Appellant was required to travel across the country and to Japan in the performance of his job. The semiconductor products he managed were manufactured in Japan and in Roseville, California and were shipped to customers throughout the United States (See Exhibit L, p.83-84 of S.E.R.). Therefore, NEC's business and Appellant's work projects involving sales and shipment of semiconductor products constituted a transaction involving commerce within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. Sect. 1 & 2.

The applicability of the statutory exclusion in 9 U.S.C Section 1 to the instant case was supported by the holdings of several courts in numerous precedent cases. In *Copley v. NCR Corporation,* 394 S.E.2d 751 (1990, W.Va), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the Circuit Court had no authority to compel enforcement of arbitration clause in employment contract since Copley, a sales representative, was involved in computer sales across state lines pursuant to the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. Section 1. In a more recent case, *Rosen v. Transx LTD.*, 816 F.Supp. 1364 (D.Minn. 1993), the court ruled that Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not apply to a truck driver who was engaged in interstate commerce.

Employment contracts of members of a "class of workers engaged in interstate commerce" as defined in 9 U.S.C. Section 1 are excluded from the application of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Even collective bargaining agreements are also considered as contracts of employment within the meaning of this exclusion. In *Herring v. Delta Airlines, Inc.*, 894 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.), 110 S.Ct. 1319 (1990), an employment contract involving airline pilots is excluded. In *United Food and Commercial Workers v. Safeway Stores, Inc.*, 889 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir.1989), agreement involving grocery store worker is excluded. In , and *American*

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Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1987), agreement involving postal service employee is excluded. In *Central States Pension Fund v. Tank Transport*, 779 F.Supp. 947 (N.D.Ill. 1991), contract involving truck driver is excluded. In *United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs. v. Miller Metal Prod.*, 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir.1954), collective bargaining agreement involving electrical workers is excluded.

Although the United States Supreme Court has not clearly explained the meaning of the contracts of employment exception in any of the court's decisions, the court did distinguish a securities registration application from an employment agreement and held that Section 1 exclusionary clause does not apply to the Gilmer's arbitration agreement in *Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991). *Gilmer* did not involve an arbitration clause contained in an agreement between an employee and employer. Gilmer's arbitration agreement was in a securities representative's securities registration application.

The court in *Agostini Bros. Building Corp. v. United States*, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir.) pointed out that Congress in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was endeavoring to exercise the full extent of its power with relation to the subject matter. There is no reason to think that it was not intended that the exception incorporated in the statute should not reach also to the full extent of its power. In *Bacashihua v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 859 F.2d 405 (6th Cir.1988), the 6th Circuit ruled that the individual worker did not have to be personally engaged in interstate commerce to have his claim excluded from FAA as long as he belonged to a "class of worker engaged in interstate commerce". In the instant case, Appellant was directly involved not only in interstate commerce but also in foreign commerce as the computer sales representative in *Copley v. NCR Corporation*, 394 S.E.2d 751 (1990, W.Va), therefore his claims should not be governed by the FAA.

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In short, under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) an exemption is provided for employment contracts of workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, Appellant's employment contract falls within the exemption of the exclusion provision. Accordingly, the District Court has no jurisdiction under the FAA to enforce the arbitration clause in NEC's company handbook. Under 28. U.S.C. Section 1447(c), the court must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded". Since the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court will be compelled under 9 U.S.C. Section 1447(c) to remand the case for further proceedings.

Having established that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply to the instant case, this Court is asked to revisit Appellant's right to pursue judicial remedies under Title VII and Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Clayton Act for all of his claims.

B. SINCE THERE WERE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR UNTIMELY RAISED ARGUMENT, THE COURT IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ON THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ARBITRATOR'S DECISION.

In the Supplemental Statement Of Facts, section III of this Petition For Rehearing, Appellant has shown exceptional circumstances for the Court not to dismiss Appellant's arguments on the arbitrary and capricious arbitration award. Appellant should not be penalized for the mistakes made by his counsel either intentionally or by negligence. Therefore, Appellant respectfully requests the Court to review and consider the entire Section D and

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E of Part III of the Revised Reply Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff (p.15-24), which, inclusive, are incorporated by reference.

Although Appellant's counsel failed to file a motion to vacate the arbitration award in the District Court, Appellant had timely commenced the vacating action by requesting the arbitrator for a trial de novo and filing the "First Amended Complaint" within the three-month period. Appellant respectfully requests the Court to remand the matter back to the District Court for further proceedings and an amended motion to vacate the arbitration award if it is now deemed proper and necessary.

C. APPLICATION OF ARBITRATION PROVISION CAN BE SUSPENDED WHEN ALLEGATION OF FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT RELATING SPECIFICALLY TO ARBITRATION PROVISION EXISTS.

According to Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C.A., Appellant can seek to avoid arbitration clause on ground that he was fraudulently induced to assent to arbitration clause. Appellant never intended to agree to final and legally binding arbitration. He never signed any contract for binding arbitration. But he was fraudulently induced to enter into such agreement by being requested to follow the four steps of NEC's company problem resolution process (See Declaration of Peter Nghiem, p.2:16-28, p.3:1-28, p.4:1-10 and Statement of Facts in Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff, p.11:8-28, p.12:1-28). Therefore, the binding arbitration provision in NEC's company handbook is invalid and unenforceable because it was induced by fraud.

A claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract containing an arbitration clause is properly referred to arbitration pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act. However,

"allegations of fraud in the inducement relating specifically to an arbitration provision may suspend application of such provision." *Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp.*, 859 F.2d 835,837 (10th Cir.1988). A plaintiff attempting to avoid an arbitration clause on the basis of fraud must plead fraud with the specificity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). See *Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.*, 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.1992).

Appellant's allegations regarding the arbitration clause are clear and non-speculative. His allegations related specifically to the binding arbitration clause in NEC' s company handbook, and thus they are sufficient to state fraud with the particularity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Therefore, the Court is requested to dismiss the enforcement of that provision.

D. ARBITRATION OF ANTITRUST CLAIM IS NOT ENFORCEABLE WHEN THERE WAS ALLEGATION THAT CONTRACT ITSELF WAS PRODUCT OF VIOLATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS.

Although the Court has ruled that antitrust claims may be arbitrated, the Court must still determine what claims the parties intended to submit to arbitration. The antitrust claim was not included in Appellant's Closing Brief at arbitration (See Exhibit A, p.1-48 of S.E.R.). Appellant supposed that private arbitration was not the right forum for his claims under antitrust laws while the arbitrator did not rule on this issue in the award. The Supreme Court in *Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd*, 470 U.S. 213, 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238 (1985), held that the parties' intent governs "even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation".

Appellant's employment contract itself was a product of NEC's violation of antitrust laws. Since Appellant was

fraudulently enticed to accept an employment contract with hidden agenda of being used as a scapegoat for the illegal restraint of trade of NEC during the period from 1989 to 1990, the arbitration of his antitrust claim is unenforceable. In *Armco Steel Co., L.P. v. CSX Corp.*, 790 F.Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1991), defendants were sued for engaging in a conspiracy to artificially inflate costs and restrain trade in violation of Section 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.. The District Court of District of Columbia held that parties were not required to arbitrate when there was allegation that contract itself was product of violation of antitrust laws.

While federal policy strongly favors arbitration, there are instances when arbitration would further manifest injustice as it did in the instant case. When the contract requiring binding arbitration is obtained by fraudulent inducement, the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) are destroyed. The *Armco* Court held that requiring a party who alleges to have been coerced into a contract, at least when there are allegations of antitrust violations, would be inequitable.

In *Armco,* steel producer's agreement to submit claims under contract to arbitration did not obligate it to arbitrate antitrust disputes arising prior to execution of contract despite its alleged knowledge of defendant's prior antitrust violations. 9 U.S.C. Section 3. Further, a party's agreement to arbitrate disputes "arising under or relating to" one contract does not obligate it to arbitrate disputes arising under a separate contract. See *In re Hops Antitrust Litigation,* 655 F.Supp. 169, 171-72 (E.D.Mo.1987).

An arbitration clause is not applicable to complaint for actions taken prior to execution of contract providing for arbitration of "any controversy . . . arising out of or relating to [] contract". See *Church v. Gruntal & Co.,* 698 F.Supp 465, 469

(S.D.N.Y.1988). In the instant case, Appellant had made several complaints to NEC's Human Resources Department about the unusual and unreasonable restraint of trade activities prior to his termination and arbitration. If his participation in arbitration is construed as entering into the arbitration clause in NEC's company handbook, he is still not obligated to arbitrate the antitrust claim.

Appellant's causes of action of "Unfair Trade Practice" and "Conspiracy" under antitrust laws are not determinable without trial and are best left to the jury or further discovery to resolve.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply to claims of Appellant, a discharged worker, against NEC, a former employer, in light of the exclusion of contracts of any class of workers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce pursuant to 9 U.S.C. Section 1. Since the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply to the instant case, the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award. Moreover, arbitration contract secured by fraud is not enforceable.

In addition, affirming the District Court's judgment to confirm the arbitration award and dismiss Appellant's action in its entirety relying on any of NEC's grounds would manifest injustice and abuse of discretion because the arbitrator's decision is arbitrary and capricious. Based on the pertinent points of fact and the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. Section 1 in addition to the exceptional circumstances presented in this petition, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court RECONSIDER the entire appeal, REVERSE the judgment of the District Court and

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REMAND the matter for *an amended motion to vacate* and further proceedings including *a trial by jury.*

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in this Petition For Rehearing is true and correct of my own knowledge.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Peter Nghiem
PETER NGHIEM
Plaintiff-Appellant
In Pro Per

DATE: June 17, 1994

APPENDIX E — REVISED REPLY BRIEF SUBMITTED ON DECEMBER 28, 1992

DAVID H. TOLLNER
Law Office of David H. Tollner
111 N. MARKET STREET
SUITE # 1020
SAN JOSE, CA 95113
Tel: (408) 279-1455

Counsel for
PETER NGHIEM

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

U.S. Court of Appeals Docket Number:
92-16155

Lower Court Docket Number:
CV-92-20135 RMW (EAI)

IN THE MATTER OF:
PETER P. NGHIEM,
Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

NEC ELECTRONICS, INC., a California corporation, NEC CORPORATION (TOKYO), Japan (Nippon Electric Company), a Japanese corporation, DR. H. YOSHIZAWA, GRANT HULSE and DOES 1-100 inclusive,

Appellee-Respondents.

Revised Reply Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff

Appendix E

TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT:

I. STATEMENT CONCERNING ISSUES

In this appeal, several issues related to Appellant-Plaintiff's right to a trial by jury are presented to the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit. The main issue is whether the District Court had jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion in granting Appellee-Respondents' motion for confirmation of the arbitration award and dismissal of Appellant-Plaintiff's action.

In reviewing the appeal, this Court is asked to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act governs the case in the absence of a valid executed contract for binding arbitration and in spite of the applicability of the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. Section 1. Since the arbitration award was arbitrary and capricious, the Court is requested to remand the matter back to the District Court for an amended motion to vacate and further proceedings. In addition, the Court is asked to review whether Appellant-Plaintiff's statutory right for federal judicial remedies under Title VII amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Clayton Act permits him to secure a trial by jury for his claims of employment discrimination and antitrust violation against Appellee-Respondents.

II. SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

All the facts stated in the attached **"Supplemental Declaration of Peter Nghiem"**, hereinafter "S.D.P.N.", and **"Declaration of Peter Nghiem"**, hereinafter "D.P.N.", inclusive, are incorporated by reference. Due to the *complexity* of the case,

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Nghiem respectfully requests the Court to *carefully examine the incorporated facts* supported by the "Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff", hereinafter "E.R", and the "Supplemental Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff", hereinafter "S.E.R", which prove that the arbitration award is arbitrary and capricious, and Nghiem has come forward with specific material facts supporting his claims. *The appeal will be incomplete without the incorporated facts.*

III. ARGUMENT

A. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASE WHERE APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF HAD A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EXCLUSION IN 9 U.S.C. SECTION 1.

NEC's assertion that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs the instant case is incorrect. The FAA does not apply to the instant case because a valid executed contract for binding arbitration does not exist and Nghiem's employment contract falls within the contracts of employment exception of the FAA. Consequently, the District Court wrongfully confirmed the arbitration award pursuant to the FAA.

The exclusion in Section 1 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. Section 1 (1947), which clearly states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of . . . *any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce*", is applicable to the instant case. Nghiem had an "employment contract" with NEC Electronics, Inc., a California Corporation, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NEC Corporation in Tokyo, Japan. NEC manufactures and markets products internationally and throughout

the United States (Exhibit L , p.83-84 of S.E.R.). Nghiem was assigned to create the infrastructure to support and expand ASIC foundry (COT) (Customer Owned Tooling) business in the U.S., to promote the sales of ASIC products, and to manage CAD strategic marketing activites including negotiation of corporate purchase contracts with U.S. CAD vendors (See Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff, 8:1-28; Exhibit A, p.6 of S.E.R.).

NEC's business, particularly Nghiem's work projects, involving sales and shipment of semiconductor products manufactured both in Japan and in Roseville, California, to customers throughout the U.S. constitutes "a transaction involving commerce" within the meaning of Section 2. The term "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the FAA as follows:

> " '[C]ommerce', as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation,"

Therefore, Nghiem was a "worker[s] engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. Section 1.

The application of the statutory exclusion in 9 U.S.C. Section 1 to the instant case was substantiated by the recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in *Copley v. NCR Corporation,* 394 S.E.2d 751 (1990, W.Va). In *Copley,* the employment contract of a sales representative who sold computer merchandise across state line, was ruled as falling within the contracts of employment exception of the FAA. Thus, the circuit

court had no authority under the FAA to compel enforcement of the arbitration clause in Mr. Copley's employment contract.

A general collective bargaining agreement was held to be a "contract of employment" within the meaning of the exclusion provision in 9 U.S.C. Section 1 by the Supreme Court in *United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.*, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.ed 286 (1987). Additionally, with the Supreme Court's guidance in *United Paperworkers,* several circuits courts have determined that the exclusion of Section 1 is appropriate for labor contracts. See *American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Services*, 823 F.2d 466, 473, (11th Cir.1987); *Bacashihua v. United States Postal Services,* 859 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.1988); *Occidental Chemical Corp. v. Local 820 International Chemical Workers Union,* 853 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.1988); *United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc.*, 889 F.2d 940 (10th Cir.1989). The Court in *American Postal Workers Union*, 823 F.2d 466 (11th Cir.1987), held that postal workers who are responsible for mail items moving in "interstate commerce" on a daily basis, are "engaged in interstate or foreign commerce" within the meaning of the statutory exclusion, and thus, the FAA does not apply. In *Bacashihua, 859 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.1988)*, the Court ruled that the FAA does not apply to the claim of a post office employee who brought action challenging dismissal, *even though he was not personally engaged in interstate commerce.*

On pages 11 and 27 of the "Brief of Defendant-Appellee", NEC deliberately misled the Court to believe that Nghiem had contradicted his own sworn statement by playing words to distort the content of Nghiem's claim in paragragh 4 and 4(c) at pages 4 and 6 of Nghiem's First Amended Complaint. To get the record straight, this is far from accurate. Nghiem actually contends that

there was no "express, executed agreement for *binding* arbitration". In addition, the record reveals that *at no place* in paragragh 4 and 4(c) at pages 4 and 6 of the First Amended Complaint did Nghiem "make[s] sworn statement that he relied upon the binding arbitration policy of NECEL as part of his basis for claiming . . .". Nghiem objects the *meritless defense* of NEC in this far-fetched insinuation of an "Appellant's statement" that does not exist.

Based on the facts presented by the parties, the inapplicability of the FAA is well established since Nghiem was a worker personally "engaged in foreign and interstate commerce" under the "Contract of Employment" with NEC (Exhibit L, p.83-84 of S.E.R.), which was a "contract of employment" within the meaning of the exclusion. Besides, the FAA's requirements were not satisfied because of the following reasons:

1) Nghiem's "Contract of Employement" with NEC does not contain an arbitration clause;

2) Nghiem's letter to Mr. Denny Mitchell requesting to proceed with step 4 of NEC Problem Resolution Process is not a valid executed written agreement for binding arbitration;

3) At no time, did Nghiem either intend or agree to subject himself to legally binding and final arbitration;

4) Nghiem was fraudulently induced to avail himself of arbitration by NEC's representations and the misleading language in NEC's company handbook;

5) The arbitration clause in NEC's company handbook is not part of Nghiem's "Contract of Employment" with NEC.

Consequently, the instant case should not have been decided under the FAA. The District Court's reliance on the FAA to confirm the arbitration award was misguided. Nghiem respectfully requests that this Court overturn the District Court's ruling and allow this case to reach a jury.

B. AN ADVERSE DECISION UNDER A PRIVATE ARBITRATION PROCEDURE DOES NOT FORECLOSE AN EMPLOYEE FROM PURSUING A DISCRIMINATION CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991.

NEC argues that the FAA applies to the instant case and, therefore, the FAA is appropriate for the resolution of Title VII claims. NEC completely ignores, however, the *Civil Rights Act of 1991* which amended *Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., allowing victims of intentional discrimination seeking compensatory or punitive damages to secure a jury trial.

NEC's reliance on the line of cases of *Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane Corp.*, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991) and *Spellman v. Securities, Annuities & Insurance Services, Inc.*, 8 Cal.App.4th 452 (July 1992) to support the District Court decision to confirm the irrational arbitration award is misplaced. The Courts in *Gilmer* and *Spellman* actually held that the exclusion in FAA did not apply to arbitration agreements in securities registration applications.

The other cases cited by NEC fall into the same category as *Gilmer* and *Spellman* where an arbitration clause exists in the employment contract and the cases were decided under the FAA. None of those cases conform to the facts and the situation of the instant case where the FAA does not apply. Therefore, those cases

provide no basis for refusing Nghiem's right to federal judiciary remedies under Title VII.

NEC did concede that the *Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.*, 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (1974), cited by Nghiem, was not decided under the FAA. In *Alexander,* the Supreme Court held that an adverse decision under a collective bargaining arbitration procedure would not foreclose an employee from pursuing a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The *Alexander* Court noted that the legislative history of Title VII "manifests a Congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes." Id., at 1019 (emphasis added). The Court also stated that the "choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive right to be vindicated". Id., at 1023 (Citing *U.S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles*, 400 U.S. 351, 91 S.Ct. 409 (1971), and concluded that "federal policy was best accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully remedies under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII." Id., at 1025-1026. The Court clearly and directly addressed its intent to "permit[ting] an employee" and "allow[ing] an individual" to pursue both remedies.

Along the same line, in *Davis v. Kitt Energy Corp.*, 365 S.E.2d 82 (1987) where a coal miner raised a claim of retaliatory discrimination under W.Va.Code, 22A-1AA-20, alleging that he had been removed from the mine safety committee for reporting safety violations, the Court stated in Syllabus Point 4 of the case that:

> "A miner against whom an arbitration decision has been rendered under a collective bargaining agreement involving a safety claim

is not foreclosed from pursuing a discrimination remedy under W.Va.Code, 22A-1A-20."

The Supreme Court in *Alexander* emphasized that the arbitration clause could not supersede or waive important statutory rights such as Title VII. Following this reasoning, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in *Liller v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission,* 376 S.E.2d 639 (1988) held that the filing of a civil service claim does not foreclose a female deputy sheriff from subsequently pursuing a sex discrimination claim. Similarly, the same Court in *Copley v. NCR Corp.,* 394 S.E.2d 751 (1990, W.Va) ruled that an arbitration clause in an employment contract could not defeat a human rights action by a sales representative alleging age and sex discrimination pursuant to a notice of right to sue.

Even where an employee is subject to the FAA, the contractual obligation to submit to arbitration cannot override or defeat a civil rights claim. See *Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,* 883 F.2d. 184 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 842 (1990); *Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc.,* 877 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir.1989); *Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc.,* 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 143; *Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,* 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir.1988); *Steck v. Barner, Upham & Co., Inc.,* 661 F.Supp 543 (D.N.J.1987); *Criswell v. West. Airlines., Inc.,* 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.1983), 105 S.Ct. 2743 (1985).

As clarified in *Alexander,* Congress has made the policy against discrimination "a highest priority," Id., at 1019. The *Utley* Court ruled that an employee could not waive prospectively her right to a judicial forum at any time, regardless of the type of employment agreement which she signed. Id., at 187. In distinguishing statutory right from contractual right in employment discrimination cases, the Supreme Court in

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Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 101 S.Ct.1437(1981), stated:

> "The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forum." Id., at 1447.

Congress has embodied its intention in line with *Alexander* and *Barrentine,* in enacting the *Civil Rights Act of 1991* on November 21, 1991. The Act significantly alters existing law. In amending Title VII of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964,* the Civil Rights Act of 1991 focuses on one principle thrust to reverse the effect of a number of Supreme Court decisions issued from 1989, which were perceived by Congress to have unduly narrowed the rights of individuals to protect themselves from employment discrimination. Nghiem's right to a trial by jury is preserved by *Section 102* of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which clearly stated that "if a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section—*any party may demand a trial by Jury.*"

Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, reverses previous court holdings that allow an employer to avoid liability for intentional discrimination in "mixed motive" cases if the employer could demonstrate that the same challenged action would have been taken even without the discriminatory motive. NEC acted with "mixed motives" in the instant case, where motivating reasons for NEC's animosity against Nghiem were Appellees' discriminatory attitude toward him and hidden endeavor to claim his work credit as their own. Moreover, NEC used Nghiem, a

Vietnamese-American, as a "scapegoat" in its conspiracy to illegally restrain trade. Regardless of the motives, Nghiem was harrassed, humiliated, intimidated and mistreated by NEC, both in private and in public, because of his race and national origin.

As adapted to a race discrimination discharge claim, Nghiem established a prima facie case by showing:

> (1) he is within the protected minority group, Vietnamese-American, (2) he was doing satisfactory work, (3) he was discharged despite the adequacy of his work and his outstanding performance, (4) he was not considered for promotion as promised despite his solid qualification in work accomplishments, industry experience and academic background, (5) he was exposed to a hostile work environment, (6) he was wrongfully terminated for unwarranted reasons, and (7) his position was filled by a white person with much less experience and qualification than him.

Such unfair treatment by NEC, in violation of the *Glass Ceiling Act of 1991*, establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, allowing Nghiem the Jury forum that the amended Title VII provides.

In short, NEC's argument relying on *Gilmer* and its line of case to preclude judicial remedies of Nghiem's Title VII claim is misplaced because the instant case is not subject to the FAA. An adverse decision under a private arbitration procedure does not foreclose Nghiem from pursuing his employment discrimination

claim in a judicial forum. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 permits Nghiem, a victim of intentional discrimination seeking compensatory and punitive damages, to secure a trial by jury, whether the FAA applies or not.

C. AN ARBITRATION AWARD CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY UNDER ANTITRUST LAWS IS NOT ENFORCEABLE, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS ARE CONTROLLED BY AMERICAN LAW.

NEC relies solely on the holding of the Supreme Court's decision in *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 105 S.Ct. 3346 (1985) to rebut Nghiem's argument on the unenforceability of an agreement to arbitrate antitrust disputes. NEC also questioned the validity of *American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.*, 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) and nine other precedent cases cited by Nghiem in which the Court of Appeals uniformly held that rights conferred by the antitrust laws are inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration. Id. NEC *misread* and *misapplied* the holding of *Mitsubishi Court* to the instant case by not recognizing the significant differences between the two cases.

The *Mitsubishi* Court assumes for the purpose of its decision that the antitrust issues would not be arbitrable if this were a purely domestic dispute (Id. 3355), but hold that the international character of the controversy makes Soler's antitrust claim arbitrable. The *Mitsubishi* Court found it unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the *American Safety* doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transactions. This decision was dissented by Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan and justice Marshall, who emphasized that the *United States Federal*

statutes should be applied if the merits of the claims are controlled entirely by American law. Id., at 3361-3373.

In the instant case, Nghiem's cause of action under *Clayton Act,* 15 U.S.C. Section 4, as an employee unjustly discharged for whistleblowing and refusal to participate in NEC's unfair trade practice is governed entirely by American law, particularly when the key defendant, NEC Electronics, Inc., is a California Corporation.

The *Mitsubishi* Court sought refuge in the application of its own precedent case *Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,* 94 S.Ct. 2449 (1974), to defend its position that if the arbitration clause were not enforced, a host of international conflict of laws problems would arise. That is not a concern in the instant case. Nghiem's case is distinctly different than *Scherk* since the outcome is governed entirely by American law as it was in *Wilko v. Swan,* 74 S.Ct. 182 (1953). The antitrust violation perpetrated by NEC Corporation in Tokyo, Japan, through conspiracy with its wholly owned subsidiary NEC Electronics, Inc. in Mountain View, California,[1] to restrain trade directly injured American PC chipset suppliers and ASIC customers in the United States. Although Nghiem was not the object of anticompetitive conduct, he was still directly injured because he was used as an essential element to fulfill NEC's secret plan to illegally restrain trade. The unlawful restraint of trade involved the delay in technology transfer and the hampering of the formation of an infrastructure in the U.S. to support ASIC foundry (COT) business in the United States. NEC restricted production at the domestic manufacturing facility in Roseville, California, to

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1. Conspiracy with its wholly owned automobile distributorships to restrain trade constitutes a violation of antitrust law spursuant to Sherman Act. See *Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,* 525 F.2d 1338 (1975).

keep pricing and production capacity controlled by NEC Corporate in Tokyo to effectively restrain trade to the detriment of U.S customers.[2] [3]

Although Nghiem's job function involved foreign and interstate commerce, the relationship between Nghiem and NEC is bound by an employment contract with NEC Electronics, Inc., a California Corporation wholly owned by NEC Corporation in Tokyo, Japan (Exhibit L, p.83-84 of S.E.R.). Foreign companies

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2. The Supreme Court has ruled that price fixing is prohibited per se, regardless of the procompetitive justifications offered. See *United States of America v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.C.*, No. 91-10040, D.C. No. VR-90-00042-ACM (9th Cir. Filed in San Francisco, CA, on September 1992) where the Court of Appeals held that dentists who conspired to fix prices received from health plan insurers for dental work to plan-member patients violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act per se. The Court instructed the jury on the per se nature of price fixing as follows:

> "Under Sherman Act, price fixing is per se illegal. If you find there was a conspiracy to fix co-payment fees, it does not matter why the fees were fixed or whether they were too high or low; reasonable or unreasonable; fair or unfair. It is not a defense to price fixing that the defendants may have had good motives, or may have thought that what they were doing was legal, or that the conspiracy may have had some good results. You may not consider any justification for fixing the fees." Id., at 10994. (Id., at 3349)

3. The Supreme Court made clear that the per se condemnation of price fixing is a substantive rule of antitrust law, not merely a device of administrative convenience in its holding that the lawyers' boycott was "a plain violation of the antitrust laws". See *FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association*, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (SCTLA). [Price-fixing agreements] are all banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy," Id., at 435 (quoting *United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.*, 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940))

engaged in business in the U.S. must comply with American law as in *Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,* 457 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 2374 (1982) where Japanese general trading company's wholly owned subsidiary which is incorporated in the U.S., is not exempt under bilateral commercial treaty from obligations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id., at 3373.

In the instant case, Nghiem had an employment contract with NEC Electronics, Inc., a California Corporation located in the U.S.. In *Mitsubishi,* Soler signed an explicit written Sales Procedure Agreement with Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, a Japanese corporation located in Japan. In addition, Soler's dealership agreement with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. contains a specific arbitration provision that requires "[a]ll disputes . . . [to] be *finally settled by arbitration in Japan* in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association." Id., at 52-53.

The *Mitsubishi* Court concluded that the arbitration clause in that agreement encompassed the antitrust claim because Mitsubishi's defense to the antitrust allegation was based on provisions in the dealer's Sale Procedure Agreement. Id. However, the Court also recognized that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral rather a judicial forum." Id., at 3354.

In the instant case, first of all, Nghiem's "Contract of Employment" does not contain an arbitration provision (See Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff, 11:8-28; 12:1-7). Taking a close look at the record, one would find that Nghiem never agreed to legally binding and final arbitration either orally or in writing.

Nothing in the text of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, nor its

legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the arbitration of any statutory claims. Id., at 3364. The express statutory remedy provisions in the *Ku Klux Act of 1871,* the *Securities Act of 1933,* the *Fair Labor Standards Act,* the *Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964* and the *Civil Rights Act of 1991,* and the antitrust laws, individually and collectively provided the Court with convincing evidence that Congress did not intend the protection of federal public policy to be administered by a private arbitrator. Id., at 3366. Particularly, when the arbitrator displays partiality and lack of competency in federal statutes as he did in the instant case.

NEC's simplistic conclusion that "Appellant's argument is thus baseless and wholly without merit" (See Defendant-Appellee's Brief, 19:3), is unwarranted and misleading in the light of substantial number of precedent supporting cases and preponderant credible evidence.[4] The Supreme Court ruling in *Mitsubishi* did not "foreclose" the importance of *American Safety* and its line of cases because of the significant difference in international character of *Mitsubishi-Soler,* which led the Court to enforce the specific written agreement to arbitrate all disputes in Japan. Significantly, the Court in *Mitsubishi* noted "[t]hat is not to say that all controversies implicating statutory rights are suitable for arbitration." Id., at 3354. Nothing in *Mitsubishi* suggests that the Court was overruling its prior holdings that arbitration agreements do not preclude access to a judicial forum for resolution of claims arising under antitrust claims.

Having established the main differences between *Mitsubishi* and the instant case, Nghiem reasserts that his cause of action of

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4. In order to present additional evidence to the existence of antitrust violation perpetrated by NEC, some trade secrets will have to be disclosed by the witnesses which could only be done properly through discovery and trial by Jury.

antitrust violation against NEC entitles him to a trial by jury. Nghiem's argument on antitrust disputes is strongly supported by the holding of *American Safety* and its line of cases (Nghiem cited nine other precedent cases in his original brief) which are more thoroughly aligned with the instant case than is *Mitsubishi.*

The Ninth Circuit in *Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp.*, 738 F.2d 1473 (1984) held that the complexity of antitrust issues and the significant public interest in antitrust enforcement, in addition to the limited expertise of the arbitrators, the limited scope of arbitrators' authority to decide issues and the procedural differences between arbitral and judicial factfinding, are reasons for denying preclusive effect to an arbitration decision on antitrust issues. This view is consistent with the previous ruling of the same Circuit in *Varo v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc.*, 504 F.2d. 1103 (9th Cir. 1974) holding that arbitration of fraud in the inducement count would be stayed pending final resolution of antitrust issues.

Since the FAA does not apply in the instant case, the court has no authority to compel enforcement of arbitration award of antitrust claim under the FAA. Even if the FAA governs the instant case, the irrational and unfair arbitration award contrary to American public policy under antitrust laws was unenforceable. Since Nghiem was unjustly discharged for whistleblowing and refusal to participate in NEC's conspiracy to illegally restrain trade in violation of public policy under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, he is entitled to a trial by jury on that issue.

D. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONFIRMING THE ARBITRATION AWARD WHICH WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO VACATION OF THE AWARD ON THE BASIS OF FRAUD, UNDUE MEANS, MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW, AND EVIDENT PARTIALITY AND MISCONDUCT OF THE ARBITRATOR.

1. The District Court cannot confirm the arbitrary and capricious award which was procured by the abuse of discretion and evident partiality of the Arbitrator.9 U.S.C. Section 10(b),(d).

Based on the reasons presented in the "*Supplemental Declaration of Peter Nghiem*" and "*Declaration of Peter Nghiem*", Appellant contends that the arbitration award was "arbitrary and capricious". See *United States Postal Service v. National Assoc. Of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO,* 847 F.2d 775 (11th Cir.1988). Nghiem was prejudiced in not being able to contest his termination on the merits and procedure in arbitration proceeding because of the evident partiality and misconduct of the Arbitrator.

Moreover, the arbitration award in the instant case was repugnant to public policy. The Arbitrator abused its discretion in rendering an irrational arbitration award contrary to American public policy under Title VII and antitrust laws. Although Nghiem presented his claim of antitrust violation against NEC in his written complaint and during the arbitration proceeding, the Arbitrator incorrectly determined that Nghiem had abandoned his claim because the issue was not addressed in the closing brief. The Supreme Court in *United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.*, 80 S.Ct. 1358 (1960) held that:

"[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation

> and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. . . . When the arbitrator's word manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." (Emphasis added.)

The Supreme Court has also noted that "the question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the courts . . .; a court may not enforce a collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy". See *W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & PLastic Workers of America,* 103 S.Ct. 2177, 2183 (1983). Under *45 U.S.C. Section 153,* an arbitration award may be vacated for failure "to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division's jurisdiction."

In the instant case, the arbitration award is irrational since the Arbitrator ruled each of the complaint issues in favor of NEC despite the lack of merit in its testimony which was proven to be false in light of credible evidence. The arbitration award whereby Nghiem took nothing and NEC was held not liable for any of Nghiem's claims was "wholly baseless and completely without reason". See *Gunther v. San Diego & Arixona E. Ry.,* 86 S.Ct. 368, 370 (1965). "[N]o judge, or group of Judges could ever conceivably have made such a ruling" if they had a chance to examine the instant case. See *Safeway Stores v. American Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l. Union, Locall 111,* 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.1968).

2. NEC's material fraud through perjury of its witnesses requires vacation of arbitration award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. Section 10(a).

Perjury constitutes fraud under *Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3).* And

certainly, there is no doubt that perjury constitutes fraud within the meaning of the FAA. See *Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc.*, 679 F.2d 1293 (1982). As held by the Court in *Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.*, 397 F.2d 594, 598 (3rd. Cir.), cert. denied, 89 S.Ct. 378 (1968), obtaining an award by perjured testimony constitutes fraud. In pertinent part, *Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)* provides as followed:

> "**(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud,etc.** On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party."

NEC's witnesses had deliberately delivered false testimonies several times under oath at arbitration proceeding to obtain a ruling in their favor (See S.D.P.N., par. 8-15).[5] Therefore, the arbitration award should be vacated on the basis of fraud. See *Harre v. A.H. Robins*, 750 F.2d 1501, 1503 (11th Cir.1985) and *Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*, 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir.1988).

3. NEC's conduct in raising facially meritless defenses in arbitration proceeding constituted procurement of arbitration award by undue means. 9 U.S.C. Section 10(a).

Judicial review is permitted when the arbitration award is

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5. Further discovery and trial by Jury is necessary for the Court to examine the *fraud* and *perjury* perpetrated by NEC in its attempt to disguise its antitrust violation and employment discrimination.

procured by undue means. In *Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCullough,* 764 F.Supp. 1365 (D.Ariz. 1991), the Court granted investors motion to vacate arbitration award holding that brokerage firm's conduct in raising multiple facially meritless defenses in arbitration proceeding constituted procurement of award by "undue means". In the instant case, NEC's meritless defenses based on unwarranted allegations and unfounded legal argument constituted procurement of arbitration award by undue means as shown below:

> 1) NEC asserted in its Closing Brief at arbitration that "Complainant [Nghiem] has shown neither outrageous conduct on the part of Respondent nor actual emotional distress on the part of Complainant" in spite of the substantial amount of evidence, to the contrary, supporting Nghiem's claim of mental anguish due to NEC's atrocious conduct (Exhibit A, p.45-47 of S.E.R.; Exhibit A, p.28-31 of Suppl. Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellee-Respondent).
>
> 2) NEC cited cases which actually contradicted with its own assertion such as "See *Lanouette v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,* 272 Cal.Rptr. 428 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1990) (long-term sales employee discharge for poor productivity was awarded damages for humiliation he claimed to have suffered), review granted, Dec 3, 1990; *Wallis v. Superior Court,* 207 Cal.Rptr. 123, 130 160 Cal.App. 3d 1109,1120 (1984) (claim was properly stated by allegations that defendant intentionally abused its superior economic position over

plaintiff without good reason and by lying about actual reasons)." (Exhibit B, p.49:16-24 of S.E.R.)

3) NEC claimed that "there is no evidence of conduct or words that might show prejudice, discrimination, animosity or dishonest motives on the part of Respondent. . ." (Exhibit B, p.49:2-4 of S.E.R.) while it blatantly used several unwarranted and defamatory allegations as termination reasons throughout the arbitration proceedings and in Nghiem's termination records issued by NEC (Exhibit A, p.1-31 of S.E.R.).

4) Regarding the antitrust violation issue, NEC asserted that "However, even taking all the alleged conduct by Respondent [NEC] as true, Complainant [Nghiem] has failed to show any injury to himself giving him standing to assert this claim. As a salaried employee of Respondent, Complainant had no independent economic interest in the success or failure of the COT business. [Citing] See, e.g., *Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc.*, et al, 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.1991)." (Exhibit B, p.50:12-20 of S.E.R.). This assertion is invalid under *Section 4 of Clayton Act, Standing of the Terminated Employee,* while the *Bhan* case does not support NEC's argument.

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4. The arbitration award should be vacated "as being in manifest disregard of the law" where the arbitrator knew the law and expressly disregarded it.

Several courts have mentioned the proposition that a "manifest disregard of the law" by the arbitrators may warrant vacating the award. See *Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.*, 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir.1988); *Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,* 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.1986); *Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc.*, 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.) cert, denied, 106 S.Ct. 2249 (1986). In a recent case, *Ainsworth v. Skurnick,* 909 F.2d 456 (11th Cir.1990), the Court held that the arbitrator's denial of damages on a statutory violation was a manifest disregard of the law, thus, the award should be vacated.

The obvious prejudicial misbehaviors of the Arbitrator in the incidents cited below establish a manifest disregard of the law:

1) The arbitrator's conclusions that NEC was not liable for any of Nghiem's claims plainly contradicted the evidence as well as the law, particularly under Title VII and antitrust laws.

2) The arbitration award was so irrational that judicial review is necessary to serve justice.

3) The arbitrator allowed NEC's witnesses to deliver perjured testimonies at arbitration proceeding (See S.D.P.N.,par.8-15).

4) The Arbitrator denied the incidents when NEC's Director of Human Resources made direct contact with the arbitrator in violation of Rule 45 of the American Arbitration Association Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules (See S.D.P.N., par. 4-5).

5. The arbitrator was guilty of misconduct in refusing to consider critical evidence pertinent and material to the controversy. 9 U.S.C. Section 10(c).

The arbitrator must allow each party "adequate opportunity" to present evidence and arguments although he is not bound to consider all evidence tendered. In *Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Center v. Union de Tronquistas Local 901,* 763 F.2d 34, 40 (1st Cir.1985), the First circuit affirmed a district court's vacatur of an award where the arbitrator "effectively denied the Company an opportunity to present any evidence in the arbitration proceeding."

In the instant case, the Arbitrator rejected the additional Arbitration Exhibits, attached to the "Closing Brief of Peter Nghiem" (See S.D.P.N., par. 1-3). The refusal of the arbitrator to consider this critical evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, deprived Nghiem of the opportunity to prove the true facts, thus, depriving him of a fair hearing.

6. Appellant's action which was construed as a motion to vacate the arbitration award, was timely commenced.

Since the FAA does not apply to the instant case, it is appropriate to borrow a limitation period from any federal statute. Essentially, in determining which statute of limitations can be borrowed for the instant case, there were three possibilities:

(1) The six-month limitation found in Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act.

(2) The six-year provision for suits against the United States in 28 U.S.C. Section 2401.

(3) The three-month period of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. Section 12.

Using any one of the federal statutes listed above, Nghiem's motion to vacate the arbitration award was timely commenced. After the arbitration award was rendered on November 18, 1991, Nghiem raised the issue by writing to American Arbitration Association on November 27, 1991 to request a trial de novo and confirm his non-binding arbitration position (Exhibit M, p.34 of E.R.), and by filing the "First Amended Complaint" in Santa Clara County Superior Court on February 5, 1992 (Exhibit S, p.63 of E.R.). Nghiem's actions are construed as the commencement of a motion to vacate the award as held by the Court in *Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*, 835 F.2d 1378, 1382 (11th Cir.1988), stating that "although technically called a 'motion', the papers filed by a party seeking to confirm or vacate an arbitration award function as the initial pleadings in post-arbitration proceedings in the district court." Consistent with the holding in *DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,* 103 S.Ct. 2281 (1983), and *American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, v. United States Postal Service,* 823 F.2d 466 (11th Cir.1987), the Supreme Court in *West v. Conrail,* 107 S.Ct. 1538, 95 L.Ed.2d 32 (1987) unanimously held that:

> "When the underlying cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of limitations makes it necessary for a federal court to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the *action is not barred if it has been "commenced" within the borrowed time period* by the filing of a complaint with the court in compliance with Rule 3 of the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure. [See C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 1056 (1969)]." Id., at 1539.

Moreover, under *Rule 15* of *Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,* an amended motion to vacate an arbitration award, filed outside of the three-month period and raising additional grounds for vacation, would be deemed timely where original motion to vacate was timely. Therefore, Nghiem respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals remands the case back to the District Court for an amended motion to vacate the arbitration award based on the vacaturs cited in this Reply Brief.

E. THE CONFIRMATION OF THE IRRATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARD AND DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S ACTION MANIFEST INJUSTICE AND DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS DUE PROCESS.

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to the matter presented to this Court because the arbitration award is irrational and procured by fraud, undue means, manifest disregard of law, and evident partiality and misconduct of the Arbitrator. Moreover, Nghiem could not have known of Appellees's practice of intentional employment discrimination against him with "mixed motives" to claim his work credit as their own and use him as a "scapegoat" in its conspiracy to illegally restrain trade. Nghiem could not have realized that he was retaliated and unjustly discharged for whistleblowing NEC's conspiracy to obstruct the development of COT (ASIC foundry) business in the U.S. and the serious management problems in NEC's ASIC group (Exhibit A, p.16-18, 35-46 of Supplemental

Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellee-Respondent). These issues in "Race Discrimination" and "Unfair Trade Practice" together with the causes of action of "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress", "Fraudulent Misrepresentation", "Unjust Enrichment" and "Conspiracy" were not presented at arbitration. Furthermore, Nghiem's antitrust claim against NEC was not decided by the Arbitrator.

The Court in *Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.*, 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 74 Cal.Rptr. 749 (1969) and *Eichler Homes, Inc. v. Anderson*, 9 Cal.App.3d 224, 87 Cal.Rptr. 893 (1970) held that collateral estoppel did not apply because the issue was not presented or decided in the first lawsuit. In *Neil Norman, Ltd. v. Williams Kasper & Co.*, 149 Cal.App.3d 942, 197 Cal.Rptr. 198 (1983), the Court held that the first lawsuit did not preclude the second under principles of res judicata because Norman could not have known of defects in the acrylic sweaters when he filed the first suit and because he still did not know of such defects when he dismissed the first suit with prejudice.

In the instant case, the requirements for application of res judicata are not met because the irrational arbitration award is by no mean "valid" and "conclusive on matters of fact and law" to be "thereafter res judicata" as stated in *Arbitration and Award*, 6 Cal.Jur.3d Section 41, p.72. The lack of credible evidence to justify the unfair and erroneous arbitration award precludes res judicata. In addition, even taking an offensive use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel by assuming the issues not presented at arbitration are derivative claims, the requirements for its application to the instant case are still not met. Nghiem did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues because of the irregularities at the arbitration proceeding cited as vacaturs in this Reply Brief.

Furthermore, the requirements for application of res judicata based on "the same parties on the same cause of action" stated in *Murphy v. Gallagher,* 761 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir.1985)) are not met in the instant case. In *Dalow Inductries, Inc. v. Jordache Enterprises, Inc.*, 631 F.Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the Court held that res judicata did not apply because Rolo and Glenn, not being parties to the Dalow-Jordache contract, did not participate in the arbitration although their representatives were made available as witnesses to both sides. Similarly, in the instant case, NEC Corporation (Tokyo), one of the Defendants in this lawsuit, is not a party to the employment contract between Nghiem and NEC Electronics Inc.. NEC Corporation (Tokyo) did not participate in the arbitration although two of the witnesses, Mr. H. Hashimoto and Dr. H. Yoshizawa, were also its representatives.

In *Standefer v. United States,* 100 S.Ct. 1999, 2008 (1980) the Supreme Court noted that " 'competing policy considerations' [may] outweigh the economy concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine." Also see *Montana v. United States,* 99 S.Ct. 970, 978 (1979). The Supreme Court later in *McDonald v. City of West Branch,* 104 S.Ct. 1799 (1984) held that "[c]ollateral estoppel is not to be applied mechanically. . . . [and] countervailing policies may justify a refusal to apply principles of estoppel". The Court ruled that a federal court should not afford res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to an arbitration award in a subsequent Section 1983 action. Id., at 1804. The Supreme Court noted that earlier cases reaching the same result in actions under other statutes (*Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,* 415 U.S.34, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (1974) (Title VII) and *Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,* 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act)) "were based in large part on our conclusion that Congress intended the statutes at issue in those cases to be judicially enforceable and that arbitration could not provide an adequate

substitute for judicial proceedings in adjudicating under those statutes." Id., at 1802-1803. This non-preclusive effect applied to arbitration awards in Section 1983 suits are also relevant in the antitrust context. Id.

In *Steckl v. Motorola, Inc.*, 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.1983), the Ninth Circuit held that the initial burden of showing the absence of a material factual issue is on the moving party. Once that burden is met, the opposing party must come forward with specific facts, and not allegations, to show that a genuine factual issue remains for trial. Id. While NEC could not show the absence of a material factual issue in the light of substantial amount of credible evidence supporting Nghiem's claims, Nghiem has met his burden of proof (See S.D.P.N., D.P.N., E.R. and S.E.R.). NEC chose not to recognize the presence of specific material facts that Nghiem had presented to the Court and cited authorities that are not applicable to the instant case. As a *complex case involving public policy violation* under Title VII and antitrust laws, this case requires a full and thorough examination of the record, better yet by a jury, to determine the motive and intent of the perpetrator (Exhibit A, p.1-49 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellee-Respondent; Exhibit A, p.1-48 of S.E.R.).

Confirming the irrational arbitration award and dismissing Nghiem's claims for any of NEC's alternative grounds including summary judgment and/or summary adjudication will **manifest injustice and deprive Nghiem of his due process**. The arbitration proceeding tainted with irregularities which resulted in an arbitrary and capricious award, did not comply with due process standards of fairness and justice. Consequently, Nghiem's causes of action are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. He is entitled to be heard by a jury for all of his claims, particularly his causes of action under Title VII and antitrust laws.

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IV. CONCLUSION

The instant case should not be decided under the Federal Arbitration Act because a valid executed contract for binding arbitration does not exist and Appellant-Plaintiff Peter P. Nghiem belongs to a class of workers "engaged in foreign and interstate commerce" with a "Contract of Employment" within the meaning of the exclusion in 9 U.S.C. Section 1. The District Court does not have jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award and dismiss the case when Appellant's "Contract of Employment" with Appellee-Respondent NEC does not contain an arbitration provision and his wrongful termination was in violation of established public policy under Title VII and antitrust laws.

Affirming the judgment based on any of Appellee's grounds would manifest injustice and abuse of discretion because the arbitration award is arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, Appellant is entitled to vacation of the award on the basis of fraud, undue means, manifest disregard of the law, and evident partiality and misconduct of the Arbitrator. This Court should deny Appellee's frivolous and meritless defense relying on inappropriate argument which has no basis in facts. An adverse arbitration decision contrary to American public policy does not foreclose Appellant's right to pursue judicial remedies for his claims under Title VII amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Clayton Act. Appellant respectfully requests that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the District Court and REMAND the matter for **an amended motion to vacate the award and a trial by jury.**

DATE: December 25, 1992

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Respectfully submitted,
Law Office of DAVID H. TOLLNER
By: s/ David H. Tollner
DAVID H. TOLLNER
Attorney for Appellant-Plaintiff

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in this Brief is true and correct of my own knowledge.

DATE: December 25, 1992

Respectfully submitted,
By: s/ Peter Nghiem
PETER NGHIEM
Appellant-Plaintiff

APPENDIX F — DECLARATION OF PETER NGHIEM IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF SUBMITTED ON OCTOBER 14, 1992

DAVID H. TOLLNER
Law Office of David H. Tollner
111 N. MARKET STREET
SUITE # 1020
SAN JOSE, CA 95113
Tel: (408) 279-1455

Counsel for
PETER NGHIEM

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

U.S. Court of Appeals
Docket Number:
92-16155

Lower Court Docket Number:
CV-92-20135 RMW (EAI)

IN THE MATTER OF:

PETER P. NGHIEM,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

NEC ELECTRONICS, INC., a California corporation, NEC CORPORATION (TOKYO), Japan (Nippon Electric Company), a

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Japanese corporation, HIRO HASHIMOTO, DR. H. YOSHIZAWA, GRANT HULSE and DOES 1-100 inclusive,

Appellees-Respondents

Declaration of Peter Nghiem
In Support of Appellant-Plaintiff's Brief

TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT:

DECLARATION OF PETER NGHIEM

Peter Nghiem, having been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1) I am Appellant in the above-entitled matter, This is a lawsuit for damages against employer NEC Electronics Inc., NEC Corporation Corporation (Tokyo) Japan and coemployees, hereinafter "NEC" or "Respondent(s)", alleging, inter alia, wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation, libel and slander, conspiracy, race discrimination and unfair trade practice.

2) I began my employment with NEC on August 31, 1989 as a Senior Product Marketing Engineer operating in the capacity of a "COT/CAD Product Manager" of the ASIC Strategic Marketing department as my functional and business title.

3) On the first day of employment, I signed a contract of employment entitled "Employment, Invention and Confidential Information Agreement" (Exhibit E, p. 17-19 of Excerpts of

Record). That agreement does not contain a provision or reference of any sort to the use of binding arbitration to resolve disputes.

4) Paragraph 11 of the contract of employment provides that "the Company and I may subsequently amend this agreement by written instruments that specifically refer to this agreement and that are executed in the same manner as this agreement". At no time did I sign a subsequent document to amend or modify the original contract of employment to agree to binding arbitration.

5) On or about January or February of 1990, a separate and distinct contract of employment was presented to me for my signature. Said contract is entitled "Employment, Invention, Authorship, Proprietary and Confidential Information, and Arbitration Agreement", 1987 version (Exhibit F, p. 20-23 of Excerpts of Record). I refused to sign that document because it contained the unambiguous employment-at-will language and the binding arbitration provision.

6) Following my termination on June 11, 1990, I was repeatedly told by NEC that the only manner in which I could resolve my complaint against NEC, was by following the four step problem resolution process contained within the policy manual (Exhibit I, p. 27 of Excerpts of Record). I was not given the option of alternative resolution process, which was my right in consideration of the fact that I never signed a contract of employment that included binding arbitration provision. I was led to believe, by the wording of the policy and by the representations of NEC, that my only option was to follow the four step process. I always believed that once that process was over, I could still bring the case before a jury if necessary.

7) NEC's policy on problem resolution process, with its

language stating that "It is the *only* process by which an employee or terminated employee may pursue a Complaint" and "If you desire to pursue the Complaint further, the Complaint *must* be submitted to an impartial arbitrator or it is waived" (Exhibit I, p. 27 of Excerpts of Record), led me to believe that the only way for me to resolve my complaint is to avail myself of arbitration. I believe my right to have a choice to take action in court instead of private arbitration is fraudulently denied, particularly for my statutory claims of employment discrimination and antitrust violation. NEC's problem resolution process also denied me a fair grievance process by requiring me, a terminated employee, to advance my own attorney's fee to effectively eliminate the possibility (Exhibit L, p. 31-33 of Excerpts of Record).

8) I did not at any time agree or intend, orally or in writing, to subject my claims to binding arbitration. It was my sincere belief that the arbitration which took place was non-binding on me because I had refused to sign the second contract of employment containing binding arbitration provision. (Exhibit F, p. 20-23 of Excerpts of Record).

9) Taking advantage of the limited fact finding process and the lack of usual rule of evidence at arbitration, Respondents deliberately delivered false testimonies to support their unwarranted allegations, based on hearsay, about my character and conducts as reasons for discharge to obtain arbitration ruling in NEC's favor.

10) Although Respondents' allegations were impeached numerous times at arbitration hearings, the arbitrator did not take any action to warn Respondents of their misconducts. A typical incident was presented in Appellant's Arbitration Closing Brief where Respondent Mr. Grant Hulse changed and recanted his

testimony (Exhibit Q, p. 60-61 of Excerpts of Record =>Appellant's Arbitration Closing Brief 21-22). Another typical example where Respondent Mr. Hiro Hashimoto, through carefully prepared testimony, pretended not to remember and recall the important incidents to deny the critical facts (Exhibit P, p. 57-59 of Excerpts of Record =>AAA Hearing Transcript 856:15-25; 857:1-25; 858:1-23).

11) The recording of my testimony at the arbitration hearing on April 3, 1991 was apparently altered to make it so unintelligible that the facts are either distorted or misunderstood (Arbitration Hearing Transcript 597-665). The english grammar structure in the recording of my testimony on April 3, 1991 was made so broken with expressions hardly used by me that it sounds like I have linguistic communication problem. I had to edit the transcript to correct the misrecordings and clarify the facts.

12) NEC conspired to deter the truthful testimonies of certain witnesses at-arbitration and influence the impartiality of the arbitrator through persistent direct contact in violation of AAA rules (Exhibit L, p. 31-33 of Excerpts of Record). NEC's Arbitration Closing Brief contained several allegations and facts which had been proven to be incorrect and unwarranted at arbitration in the light of substantial amount of evidence including witnesses' testimonies and exhibits (Exhibits C and D, p. 9-16 of Excerpts of Record).

13) I believe that my civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(2) have been violated by NEC who conspired to obstruct and defeat the due course of justice to continue the disguise of its unlawful activities in employment discrimination and illegal restraint of trade.

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14) The List of Chronological Events (Exhibit C, p. 9-14 of Excerpts of Record) and the NECEL ASIC Organization Chart presented at arbitration as exhibit 65B were lost when they were in the arbitrator's custody. I had to recreate them and resubmitted them with Plaintiff's Arbitration Closing Brief at the end of arbitration.

15) The arbitrator was uncertain whether I had standing to claim damages under antitrust laws. At the beginning of arbitration, Mr. John Kagel questioned that ". . . whether you (Nghiem) can even have a standing on the part of an individual to claim that there was an antitrust violation that would run to that individual. I just don't know." (Exhibit P, p. 50-51 of Excerpts of Record =>AAA Hearing Transcript 12:24-25;13:1-2).

16) The arbitrator did not understand the nature of the illegal restraint of trade practiced by NEC in 1989 and 1990. Mr. Kagel did not recognize the fact that I, in concurrence with NEC's intentional employment discrimination, was discharged for my refusal to participate in NEC's unfair trade practice (Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, p. 42-47) and my "whistleblowing" to Mr. Denny Mitchell, Director of Human Resource department about NEC's unlawful activities (Exhibit N, p. 35-40 of Excerpts of Record). In the third hearing, the arbitrator commented that "I don't know what you think the law is with respect to antitrust. I will allow you to submit that to me, . . . so I can look it up. . . . Because I do not know of an active claim by an employee who is given a work assignment . . . and then in some view believes that that work assignment was sabotaged by somebody for lack of support, either intentionally or negligently, to lead to antitrust violation, at least where there is no profit sharing arrangement involved." (Exhibit P, p. 52 of Excerpts of record =>AAA Hearing Transcript 499:2-16).

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17) The fact that I availed myself of arbitration without knowing that antitrust claim is unenforceable under a private arbitration agreement, does not affect my rights to statutory remedies. The language in the arbitration clause in NEC's company handbook does not encompass a claim that employer entered into a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws. Besides, I did neither intend nor agree to be abided by NEC's binding arbitration provision which is not included in my "Contract of Employment".

18) The issue of employment discrimination was not fully examined by the arbitrator. I, myself, used the arbitration hearings as a fact finding process to establish my causes of action in court. Realizing that NEC was not resolving the dispute in good faith, and continue to disguise its employment discrimination practices against me and its hidden agenda in illegal restraint of trade , I timely initiated a complaint of race discrimination against NEC in California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) on June 3, 1991 (Exhibit J, p. 28 of Excerpts of Record). A few days later, I filed a lawsuit in Santa Clara County Superior Court on June 10, 1991 (Exhibit R, p. 62 of Excerpts of Record) which is shortly after the fourth arbitration hearing. Subsequently, I obtained the Right-To-Sue letter from California DFEH on June 15, 1991 (Exhibit K, p. 29-30 of Excerpts of Record).

19) By participating in an arbitration without signing any agreement for binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, I did not intend to waive my causes of action under Title VII and antitrust laws in federal court.

20) NEC's failure to treat me with fairness and equity, and its refusal to promote me to a management position as promised despite my solid qualification while intentionally harassing and

humiliating me in private and in public, because of my race and national origin establish prima facie case of race discrimination (Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint 35-39) where evidence overwhelmingly indicated that I was efficient in required area of work accomplishments, organizational skills, interpersonal relationship skills, project management and communication skills (Exhibit O, p. 41-49 of Excerpts of record). NEC's continuing intentional discrimination which subjects me to severe mental anguish and emotional distress in violation of established public policy under Title VII entitles me to a trial by a jury of my peers.

21) The arbitrator rejected the additional exhibits attached to Plaintiff's Closing Brief including expert's analysis of damages (Exhibit L, p. 31-33 of Excerpts of Record). Not all causes of action cited in my original Complaint and First Amended Complaint were addressed by the arbitrator such as conspiracy, negligent infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment and unfair trade practice. In addition, the arbitrator did not include any conclusions of law in its award in favor of NEC while the findings of fact is incomplete.

22) NEC attempted to conceal evidence by failing to attach the complete set of Appellant's First Amended Complaint package to NEC's Notice of Removal of Action when NEC removed the case to federal court on March 6, 1992. The First Amended Complaint package contains a pleading of fourty-nine pages long together with the fifty-pages Arbitration Closing Brief, the Index of Exhibits (Exhibit C, p. 9-14 of Excerpts of Record), the List of Chronological Events (Exhibit D, p. 15-16 of Excerpts of Record) and the formal complaint to California DFEH (Exhibit J, p. 28 of Excerpts of Record). Only the fourty-nine pages pleading of the First Amended Complaint was attached to NEC's Notice of Removal of Action.

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23) Judge Whyte's ruling on June 9, 1992 in favor of NEC (Exhibit A, p. 1-6 of Excerpts of Record) is derived from insufficient and erroneous facts, and the misinterpretation of my intent. I did neither intend nor agree to subject my claims to binding arbitration in my letter to Mr. Denny Mitchell requesting to proceed with Step-four of NEC's problem resolution process. That letter is not a contract of binding arbitration amending my "Contract of Employment". The Court erred in stating that I "sits idle while arbitration decision is rendered" and did not initiate the complaint in Santa Clara County Superior Court until February of 1992. In fact, I did initiate the lawsuit against NEC in Santa Clara County Superior Court on June 10, 1991 (Exhibit R, p. 62 of Excerpts of Record), five months before the end of arbitration. Furthermore, I did confirm my disagreement with the arbitrator's ruling and my non-binding arbitration position in writing when I asked AAA for a trial de novo on November 27, 1991 (Exhibit M, p. 34 of Excerpts of Record).

24) The district court did not address the merits of the case in the judgment issued on June 9, 1992, particularly the issues on race discrimination and antitrust violation where public policy was violated.

25) My actions in requesting AAA for a trial de novo on November 27, 1991 (Exhibit M, p. 34 of Excerpts of Record) and submitting the First Amended Complaint to Santa Clara County Superior Court on February 5, 1992 (Exhibit S, p. 63 of Excerpts of Record) are construed as a motion to vacate the arbitration award.

26) Because of the fraud, undue means and "manifest disregard of the law" occurred at arbitration, the arbitration award was rendered erroneously in favor of NEC. I respectfully contend that the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award and

dismissal of my complaint in its entirety resulted in manifest injustice. Should the Court of Appeals decided that the Federal Arbitration Act applies despite the absence of a specific, valid and executed contract for binding arbitration, I respectfully prays the Court to remand the district court's decree with orders to vacate the arbitration award.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in this Statement of Declaration is true and correct of my own knowledge and that the exhibits attached to Appellant-Plaintiff's Brief are true and accurate copies of the documents I have stated them to be.

DATED: October 14 , 1992, Executed at San Jose, California.

BY: s/ Peter Nghiem
PETER NGHIEM
Appellant-Plaintiff

APPENDIX G — SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF PETER NGHIEM IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF SUBMITTED ON DECEMBER 14, 1992

DAVID H. TOLLNER
Law Office of David H. Tollner
111 N. MARKET STREET
SUITE # 1020
SAN JOSE, CA 95113
Tel: (408) 279-1455

Counsel for
PETER NGHIEM

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

U.S. Court of Appeals
Docket Number:

92-16155

Lower Court Docket Number:

CV-92-20135 RMW (EAI)

IN THE MATTER OF:

PETER P. NGHIEM,

Appellant-Plaintiff

Appendix G

v.

NEC ELECTRONICS, INC., a California corporation, NEC CORPORATION (TOKYO), Japan (Nippon Electric Company), a Japanese corporation, HIRO HASHIMOTO, DR. H. YOSHIZAWA, GRANT HULSE and DOES 1-100 inclusive,

Appellee-Respondents.

Supplemental Declaration of Peter Nghiem
In Support of Appellant-Plaintiff's Reply Brief

TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT:

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF PETER NGHIEM

Peter Nghiem, having been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1. FACTS RELEVANT TO IRRATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARD:

All the facts stated in the the "Declaration of Peter Nghiem In Support of Appellant-Plaintiff's Brief", inclusive, are incorporated by reference.

1) The arbitrator, Mr. John Kagel, in his letter dated October 14, 1991 to Mr. David Weinberg, Director of Labor Services of American Arbitration Association (AAA) (Exhibit E , p. 63-64 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record), refused to consider and rejected the additional Arbitration Exhibits attached to the

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"Closing Brief of Peter Nghiem" which are listed below:

(AAA Exhibit #)

"C" Article from September, 1988 Business Week entitled "A Matter of Control".

"D" Senator Tom Lantos Hearing on Employment Discrimination by Japanese Owned Companies in the United States.

"E" Expert Arthur Clark's Curriculum Vitae.

"F" Expert Arthur Clark's Compensatory Damage Calculations for Wage Loss/Breach of Contract.

"G" Nghiem's canceled bonus check from NEC for calendar year 1990.

"H" Nghiem's Curriculum Vitae.

"I" Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) Complaint filed by Nghiem.

"J" Dave Nieto's Investigation Notes.

(Exhibit C, p. 14 of Excerpts of Record)

2) The Arbitrator refused to admit into evidence the investigation notes of Dave Nieto, Manager of Corporate

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Compensation Benefits and Information Systems for NEC Electronics (Exhibit D, p. 58-62 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record), that Nghiem requested in the hearings. This crucial document was necessary to determine whether NEC's Human Resource department had thoroughly and properly verified the facts before discharging Nghiem.

3) Dave Nieto's Investigation Notes (Exhibit D, p. 58-62 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record) showed a sloppy and improper review done by NEC's Human Resource department who relied on the unwarranted allegations of Mr. G. Hulse and Mr. H. Hashimoto, and hearsay evidence to unjustly discharge Nghiem (See Exhibit A, p. 1-48 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record).

4) Despite Rule 45 of American Arbitration Association Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules which prohibited direct communication with the arbitrator, NEC persisted in making direct contacts with the Arbitrator whenever it felt that it would work toward its advantage, as accounted for, in at least three occasions (Exhibit L, p. 31 of Excerpts of Record; Exhibit F, p. 65-73 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record).

5) The Arbitrator, in his letter to Mr. Weinberg dated October 14, 1991 (Exhibit E, p. 63-64 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record), denied the fact that Mr. Denny Mitchell, Director of Human Resource of NEC Electronics Inc., had violated AAA rules in making direct contacts with the arbitrator.

6) Nghiem was asked to pick an arbitrator from the three candidates that NEC had preselected and prequalified. The Arbitrator was solely compensated by NEC.

7) The arguments of the parties at arbitration surrounded the

incidents engineered by NEC as pretextual causes for termination. (See Exhibit A, p. 1-48 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record). The arbitration proceedings indicated that the Arbitrator focused only on the contractual issues of Nghiem's discharge while his statutory claims under Title VII and antitrust laws were not properly examined.

8) The AAA "Closing Brief of Peter Nghiem" (Exhibit A, p. 1-48 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record) was prepared by Mr. Robert Kahn, Nghiem's counsel at the end of arbitration, after he had fully examined the arbitration proceedings and exhibits. The "Background and Pertinent Facts" in the closing brief (Exhibit A, p. 6-31 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record) which presents the true facts derived from ample and credible evidence, proves that NEC's allegations are unwarranted.

9) As presented in the "Declaration of Peter Nghiem In Support of Appellant-Plaintiff's Brief" on fact number 10, p. 4:17-28, Mr. G. Hulse, Product Marketing Manager, and Mr. H. Hashimoto, ASIC General Manager, committed perjury when they delivered false testimonies under oath at arbitration proceeding. These obvious incidents were cited in the "Declaration of Peter Nghiem" as typical examples of numerous other incidents of perjury since their versions of the facts were far from correct (Exhibits P and Q, p. 57-61 of Excerpts of Record; Exhibit A, p. 24-27 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record).

10) Mr. H. Hashimoto denied the fact that he had directly assigned the contract negotiation and discussion of the technology partnership with Cadence to Nghiem although he personally introduced Nghiem at that capacity to Cadence management, Mr. Larry Fagg, Account Manager, and Dr. Lawrence Rosenberg, Director of Advanced EDA Development (Exhibit P, p. 57-59 of

Excerpts of Record; Exhibit C, p. 56 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record). For the preparation of contract negotiation strategy (Exhibit H, p. 76-77 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record), Nghiem received the projected number of CAD design systems using Cadence tools (Code name ACE) for NEC corporate in Japan over a period of four years based on the yen/dollar exchange rate directly from Dr. Hiroshi Kawanishi who managed this project in Japan for NEC Tokyo (See Exhibit I, p. 78 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record). Due to the complexity of a corporate-wide contract and his heavy workload, Nghiem, subsequently, requested the support of Mr. Ernie Frolichman, Staff Contract Administrator, who worked closely with Nghiem and Cadence over a period of around four to five months to finalize the terms and conditions of the multi-year multi-million dollars technology partnership and corporate-wide purchase agreement (See Exhibit C, p. 55-57 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record).

11) Mr. H. Hashimoto refused to testify truthfully by pretending not to remember and recall any critical facts (Exhibit A, p. 30 (25:9-11), Exhibit C, p. 53 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record; Exhibit P, p. 57-59 of Excerpts of Record). His denial of any direct assignments to Nghiem is inconsistent with the evidence where Mr. H. Hashimoto often gave Nghiem his direction on the COT and CAD issues (Exhibit C, p. 12 of Excerpts of Record (AAA Exhibits 61 and 64-67)). Although he was not Nghiem's direct supervisor, he did assign work directly to Nghiem from the project management stand point. And of course, Mr. G. Hulse never objected this management style since that would free him to complete his own "Standard Cell Catch-Up" project. Both Nghiem and Mr. G. Hulse had separate and, somewhat, independent work projects assigned by Mr. Hashimoto who later did not acknowledge his own department direction at arbitration while trying to take Nghiem's work accomplishments in the COT

and CAD area and give them to Mr. Hulse (Exhibit C, p. 51-52 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record; Exhibit O, p. 41-49, Exhibit N, p. 35-38 of Excerpts of Record; Exhibit A, p. 6 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellee-Respondent).

12) The alleged misconducts and incidents which were used as causes for Nghiem's termination, are falsely testified by Mr. G. Hulse as shown in the "Closing Brief of Peter Nghiem" prepared by Mr. Robert Kahn. Mr. Hulse falsely denied the occurrence, informality and flexibility of the weekly meetings with Nghiem despite the supporting evidence in Nghiem's notebook and did not produce his log book as requested (Exhibit A, p. 24-25 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record). Mr. Hulse's allegations have severe weaknesses from the start. And gradually, these weaknesses reached the point of unreasonableness (Exhibit A, p. 24-31 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record; Exhibit N, p. 35-39 of Excerpts of Record).

13) The Arbitrator clearly displayed his partiality during arbitration proceeding by helping NEC's witnesses with their own testimonies and leading them to testify the way he expected. As a typical example, during the cross-examination of Mr. H. Hashimoto who denied Nghiem's accomplishment in coordinating a successful CICC (Custom Integrated Circuits Conference) trade show for NEC in Boston (Exhibit G, p. 74-75 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record), the Arbitrator elaborated the witness's answer and led Mr. H. Hashimoto and Mr. G. Hulse to agree to his own preconceived version of the facts. Mr. G. Hulse knew quite well that it was wrong, but he still went along with it to accept the work credit for his own benefit (Exhibit C, p. 51-52 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record; Exhibit G, p. 74-75 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record). This biased cross-examination approach was conducted by the Arbitrator throughout the arbitration proceeding.

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14) At several instances in arbitration proceeding, instead of being frustrated at Mr. H. Hashimoto who was trying to hide the truth by pretending not being able to remember any critical facts while Nghiem was properly cross-examining the witness, the Arbitrator ridiculed Nghiem's questions or redirected the questions in favor of NEC's witness (Exhibit C, p. 53-54 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record).

15) The Arbitrator took no action to warn Mr. G. Hulse and Mr. H. Hashimoto of their perjury conducts and ironically adopted their false testimonies as the truth in the award. The unfair and erroneous award whereby Nghiem took nothing and NEC was held not liable for any of Nghiem's claims, was not supported by the substantial amount of credible evidence.

2. FACTS RELEVANT TO STATUTORY CLAIMS:

All the facts stated in the "Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff", the "First Amended Complaint For Damages" (Exhibit A, p. 1-49 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellee-Respondent) and the "Closing Brief of Peter Nghiem" (Exhibit A, p. 1-48 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record), inclusive, are incorporated by reference.

16) Nghiem was assigned to generate COT pricing matrices for the ASIC foundry business, but he was not able to gather all necessary yield and cost information from Mr. Tadahiro Hashimoto, Manager of Planning Department, and his staffs who resided in NEC's domestic manufacturing facility in Roseville, California. With the information on actual wafer process cost, packaging cost, assembly and test cost, and various yield rates at different manufacturing stages, Nghiem would be able to generate pricing matrices by die size and package size (See Exhibits J and K,

p. 79-82 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record). When Nghiem attempted to obtain the process yield, assembly and test yield, and manufacturing capability information from Mr. Hideto Goto, Assistant Department Manager of Production Engineering, in Roseville to generate COT pricing and marketing materials, Mr. H. Goto displayed an irrational agitated behavior to postpone the discussion of the issues (Exhibit A, p. 19 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record).

17) The pricing information generated from Roseville facility would reveal the hidden marked up profit margin of NEC Tokyo which was included in the transfer prices of the products shipped from NEC's facilities in Japan to NEC Electronics, Inc. in the U.S.. Therefore, Mr. T. Hashimoto insisted that he would generate the pricing matrices himself after he and his staffs exhibited a reluctance to disclose the requested cost and yield information (Exhibit A, p. 9 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellee-Respondent). The revealed breakdown cost information of the transfer prices of products shipped from Japan to the U.S. could affect the accounting records of NEC. Moreover, NEC Tokyo would have had difficulty in fixing price and restraining trade to manipulate market to the detriment of U.S. customers, particularly Chips & Technologies Inc.. (Recently, after the IRS announced that foreign companies in the U.S. owe approximately $35 billion in uncollected taxes, the Japanese firms have agreed to follow Matsushita to settle a formula with the IRS to pay taxes).

18) The COT Strategic Marketing Plan developed by Nghiem for the Product Planning Meeting in Japan in the week of November 13, 1989 together with the implementation strategies that he presented at the National Sales Conference in the week of February 4, 1990 were overshadowed by Mr. Hashimoto's empty

promises of adequate engineering resource and management support for the COT program (Exhibit A, p. 9-11 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record; Exhibit A, p. 8-10 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellee-Respondent). In addition, NEC Tokyo obstructed the transfer of technical information required for the ASIC foundry (COT) design activity and business development in the U.S., as verified by Dr. Hitoshi Yoshizawa (Exhibit P, p. 53-56 of Excerpts of Record), to restrict production at the domestic manufacturing facility in Roseville and control prices (Exhibit A, p. 42-46 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellee-Respondent).

19) Several issues under the causes of action of "Race Discrimination" and "Unfair Trade Practice" were not presented to the Arbitrator because they were not known by Nghiem when he filed the complaint at arbitration (Exhibit A, p. 16-18 35-46 of Supplemental Excerpts of Record for Brief of Appellee-Respondent). The Arbitrator did not rule on Nghiem's claim of antitrust violation against NEC because he incorrectly assumed that Nghiem dropped that claim.

20) The facts mentioned in this Supplemental Declaration can be further elaborated through court order for more discovery of the **fraud** and **perjury** perpetrated by NEC.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in this Statement of Declaration is true and correct of my own knowledge and that the exhibits attached to Appellant-Plaintiff's Brief are true and accurate copies of the documents I have stated them to be.

DATED: December 14, 1992, Executed at San Jose, California.

BY: s/ Peter Nghiem
PETER NGHIEM
Appellant-Plaintiff